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27 April 1977

TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1383

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

COMMENTS ON BLOC PARTY SECRETARY CONFERENCE IN SOFIA

Planning of Ideological Counteroffensive

Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 3 Mar 77 p 5

[Article by Boris Pop Gorchev, permanent correspondent of NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Moscow]

[Text] At the meeting of communist parties of the "socialist community" that will take place in Sofia, three secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee will be in attendance: Boris Ponomarev, a candidate member of the Politburo, Konstantin Katushev, and Mikhail Zimyanin.

The fact that the delegation of the CPSU will include three high party functionaries indicates that Moscow attributes great importance to the coming consultation, and confirms that very important questions will be discussed in Sofia. In the CPSU Central Committee, Ponomarev is responsible for relations with Western communist parties, Katushev has responsibility for communist parties that are in power, and Zimyanin, who received his duties by election at the 25th CPSU Congress, directs propaganda within the party. This sort of delegation at the same time makes it possible to hypothesize the type of things that will be discussed at the meeting even though the agenda, as is customary, has not been revealed.

An Indication of the Berlin Conference

In recent years such party or ideological consultations have been held in Sofia, Prague, Moscow, and, at the end of January 1976, in Warsaw. At that time, in addition to the seven members of the Warsaw Pact--Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, there were also delegations from the communist parties of Cuba and Mongolia. It is expected that this same composition will be found in Sofia, with the possibility of the added presence of Vietnam.

Although only 13 months have passed since the last conference in Warsaw, in that time the world scene, particularly the international communist movement, has experienced significant events. Some communist parties of the

"socialist community" and outside it have held congresses of their own, and last summer in Berlin there was the long-awaited conference of European communist and workers parties. Finally, at the end of last year came the meeting of the Political and Consultative Committee of the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Within the framework of the celebration of Leonid Brezhnev's 70th birthday in Moscow, the leaders of the bloc countries will gather in Moscow, while all of them separately will be in contact in the Crimea with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Some plan to make additional official visits to the USSR. It is understood that these contacts at the highest level will be followed by suitable communications between high party functionaries and delegations within the "community."

In such circumstances and in this space it is difficult to find a common denominator to define the events and intentions that are being manifested in a period that is so rich in events, to separate the old from the new. Nevertheless, it seems that two features are the most essential.

Reality and Differences

In the preparations for the Berlin conference, during it and in the document adopted by it, all procedures were verifiably open, with a free and equal exchange of opinions in which each party presented its own evaluations while respecting the views of others, or the existing differences. As an expression of the complex processes and deep changes in the contemporary world, separately in the workers movement and also in the communist parties themselves, the right of each party was affirmed to determine its own policies and its own path in the struggle for progress and socialism, in agreement with the historical circumstances in its country, with responsibility to its own working class and people. That independence and equality rejects the need for the existence of a center of leadership or a leading party, for the formulation of some type of general party line, coordinated action, or limiting directives. On the contrary, it guides forces into the development of such international, voluntary collaboration and solidarity that would be regarded as equal and sovereign independence of every party.

It could not be said that the CPSU, for example, does not keep track of these new, realistic conditions in the international communist movement, and this is even more true since it is a signer of the Berlin document. However, here there is already a "mixture" of various conceptions, and in most recent times "variations" on some themes are encountered which at best can be labeled as debatable, since there is a complete and an abbreviated version of "the Berlin formula" and a certain nostalgia for timeworn schemes. After a certain silence (but not a rejection), once more there is a clear call in defense of the category of proletarian internationalism as the basis and the criterion for relations between parties, in particular toward the CPSU. There is an insistence on monolithic structure, unity of action, and conciliation of parties, especially these in the "socialist community."

Another feature of the present period is the strong campaign from the West for human rights, personal freedom, and respecting the spirit and letter of

Helsinki. These new attacks are regarded in Moscow as a new "diversion" towards the USSR and the socialist countries, immediately preceding the Belgrade meeting. The need for organized collaboration and integration in the realm of ideology was also raised in the party conference in Warsaw, and certainly that will be one of the central topics in the coming days at Sofia. The articles that have appeared recently strongly stress the need for an increased ideological struggle against various "imperialist, reactionary and other outrages" seeking to infiltrate with "foreign ideology and propaganda," and a coordinated joint platform is expected in that sense for a counteroffensive that, in any case, has already begun here against the statements coming from the West as well as those that emerge from domestic soil.

Adopt Unified Stand for Belgrade Conference

Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 5 Mar 77 p 3

[Article by Filip Simonovski, permanent correspondent of NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Sofia]

[Text] Yesterday in Sofia deliberations were concluded between the secretaries for international and ideological matters of the central committees of the communist parties of the Eastern European countries, Cuba and Mongolia. Eighteen secretaries of these parties worked behind closed doors, and as it appears now, the meeting took place in the spirit of international solidarity and equality. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Party, and President of the Bulgarian State Council Todor Zhivkov held a reception on the evening before the conference for the three Soviet secretaries attending, Boris Ponomarev, Konstantin Katushev, and Mikhail Zimyanin. Boris Ponomarev was the chief speaker at the banquet held in honor of the participants which was the practical conclusion of the 2-day meeting. The banquet was also arranged by Todor Zhivkov.

The expected joint communique has not yet been published in Sofia. The Bulgarian wire service completed its broadcast last night without this communication, instead of which this morning it broadcast its own report. From this the conclusion can be drawn that no joint communique was signed at the meeting.

The West Is Interfering in the Internal Affairs of the Socialist Countries

The Bulgarian wire service report states that the participants at the conference expressed their satisfaction with the development of mutual ideological cooperation, and that opinions were exchanged concerning actions to be undertaken in connection with the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the October revolution. They stressed the important role of mass informational media in the struggle for total, comprehensive achievement of the principles and agreements contained in the final declaration of the Helsinki conference so as to assure favorable circumstances for the Belgrade conference, which was called upon to make a positive contribution to strengthening peace and security in Europe.

One of the major questions discussed at the conference was the creation of a joint platform to parry the strong campaign of the West concerning the democratic, human rights of man, and personal freedom. The report of the Bulgarian wire service had but one single sentence on this subject. The agency states that at the conference, the need was stressed for exposing anticommunism and for giving resistance to the campaign against the socialist countries, which has been organized by imperialistic circles that are seeking to corrupt the foreign and domestic policies of the socialist countries and to interfere in their domestic affairs.

The Essence of Socialist Unity

The brief report of the wire service had no space to say anything further about crucial ideological features of the Sofia conference. Some are readily apparent, however, from today's editorial in the party organ RABOTNICHESKO DELO, until now the only published account of the meeting of the secretaries for foreign affairs and ideology of the "fraternal parties." The editorial attacks the notion that there are two forms of socialism, stating that this thesis was suggested with the intent of discrediting "real socialism," and within that framework, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European community. Some sort of "acceptable socialism" was to be substituted. RABOTNICHESKO DELO continues "Against the theoretical and practical experiences of the 6 decades since the victory of the first proletarian revolution, despite and against the enormous historical experience of the CPSU, despite and against the solid experience of the entire socialist community in building our society, there will never be anything anywhere to compare with the example of the Soviet people."

"No one can weaken or shake the natural gravitation of fighters for peace and socialism to the cradle of the first socialist revolution, the Soviet Union." Thus concluded the editorial of the party organ RABOTNICHESKO DELO, which bore the very typical title "The Essence of the Unity of World Socialism."

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ALBANIA

BALLUKU, DUME, CAKO BROUGHT FOREIGN LITERATURE TO ARMY

Tirana ZERI I RINISE in Albanian 12 Jan 77 pp 2-3

[Article by Sevo Tarifa: "Ideological Aggression and Our Duties"]

[Excerpts] Ideological aggression is a hostile ideological pressure. The individual is in the middle of two pressures: internal pressure and external pressure. The old remnants which the individual has in his awareness cause the internal pressure. These are "invisible enemies." For our enemies, these are not "remnants" but their real ideologies. Foreign pressure is that which bourgeois-revisionist ideology exerts against us. Under these two pressures, there have been individuals in our ranks who have deviated, capitulated, and degenerated and have become hostile and antisocialist.

If we know the channels [for pressure] then we can prepare ourselves for combating ideological aggression.

What are some of these poisonous channels?

Let us begin with the bourgeois and revisionist press. Attempts by the putschists Beqir Balluku, Petrit Dume, and Hito Cako to put revisionist literature in the armed forces are clear expressions of the ideological aggression by which these plotters paved the way for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat, while also relying on foreign armed intervention. Therefore, increased attention must be given to improving vigilance and the militant class spirit against efforts which foreign enemies are making to make their poisonous literature penetrate into our country.

CSO: 2100

BULGARIA

REGULATION FOR THE APPLICATION OF PEOPLE'S MILITIA LAW

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 18 Mar 77 pp 227-231

["Council of Ministers Regulation on the Application of the People's Militia Law" (passed by Decree Number 11 of the Council of Ministers, dated 28 February 1977)]

[Text] Chapter One

General Stipulations

Article 1. The people's militia shall perform the tasks assigned to it by virtue of the Law on the People's Militia (described in the regulation for the sake of brevity as the law), other laws and ukazes and normative acts issued by the Council of Ministers, with the strict observance of socialist legality, and the principles of socialist humanism and one-man command. In the course of its activities it shall develop comprehensively its ties with the working people and rely on their active assistance.

Article 2. The people's militia officials must display high standards in their work. They must communicate with the citizens tactfully and politely. They must respect their honor and dignity and be vigilant and disciplined.

Article 3. (1) Officials employed by establishments, and economic and other organizations shall deem it their duty to provide aid and assistance to the people's militia personnel, supply them with the necessary information, and facilitate them in the implementation of their official assignments.

(2) The citizens must not create difficulties to the people's militia authorities or hinder their activities.

Chapter Two

Implementation of Tasks, and Rights and Obligations of the People's Militia

Article 4. In order to implement their assignments related to the preservation of public order, the people's militia shall:

1. Implement a system of measures aimed at maintaining the public order in settlements, resorts, public establishments, mass ceremonies, meetings, demonstrations, sports competitions, and cultural and other public actions;
2. Control the implementation of decisions passed by state organs related to public order by officials and citizens;
3. Adopt the necessary measures to prevent or stop violations of the public order and promote its restoration should it be violated;
4. Struggle, together with state and public organs and organizations, against hooliganism, idleness, vagrancy, begging, alcoholism, moral slackness, drug addictions, and other anti-social actions;
5. Together with its other obligations, help the people's councils in the case of natural or social calamities in involving the aid of the population and securing transportation facilities from establishments and economic and other organizations, needed for the implementation of rescue, breakdown repair, and quarantine measures.

Article 5. With a view to protecting the rights and legitimate interests of citizens and socialist organizations and the protection of socialist property, the people's militia shall:

1. Take measures for the prevention of crimes or other anti-social actions harming the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens and the socialist organizations;
2. Take measures to provide first aid to victims of accidents or individuals who find themselves in a helpless condition in public places;
3. Assist the medical authorities in the implementation of urgent sanitary measures for the elimination or limitation of reasons and conditions factually endangering the life and health of the population;
4. Organize a patrol post service and use signaling-protection equipment and other ways and means for the protection of socialist property and the property of the citizens;

5. Investigate reports and communications submitted by officials and citizens concerning crimes of a general nature;
6. Demand of the proper officials to conduct in accordance with established procedure and within stipulated periods of time audits and inventory-taking in the presence of data indicating the commission of a crime in an establishment or an economic or other organization;
7. Study data on crime in individual national economic sectors and inform the corresponding party and state authorities on established reasons and conditions contributing to the commission of crimes.

Article 6 (1) Implementing its tasks as per Article Six of the Law of the People's Militia shall also:

1. Engage in general and individual preventive work to prevent the citizens from the commission of crimes or other anti-social actions;
2. Implement measures aimed at the prevention of crimes and other anti-social actions, determining the reasons and conditions which create them, and implementing or suggesting measures for their elimination;
3. Engage in operative investigations leading to the exposure of committed crimes and their perpetrators;
4. Organizes and maintains constant operative guard duty for the protection of public order, the life and health of the citizens, and socialist and private property, and insure traffic safety;
5. Implements the orders of the prosecutor's office and the courts on the mandatory escort and detention of individuals;
6. Implements the decisions of the respective authorities on placing minors and juveniles in labor-education schools;
7. Guards and escorts detained individuals;
8. Provides prompt records and accounts on committed crimes of a general nature and other delinquencies;
9. Submits to the respective authorities, organizations, and labor collectives data on individuals who have committed anti-social actions so that the necessary measures of social influence may be taken;
10. Safeguards documents, valuables, and other objects found and delivered to the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and takes measures to insure their return to their legal owners or, should it be impossible to determine ownership, submits them to the respective people's council.

(2) The people's militia shall carry out the assignments entrusted to it on the basis of any other law, ukaze or normative act issued by the Council of Ministers in accordance with established procedure.

Article 7. (1) The issuing of a warning as per Article 12, paragraph 2, of the law to individuals about whom reliable data exists of the possibility for their commission of crime or a gross violation of the public order shall be done with a written statement.

(2) The written statement mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall describe the legal violation which may be committed by the individual, the consequences, and the responsibility of the warned individual.

Article 8. The people's militia officials may request of the citizens, under the stipulations of Article 17 of the law, to present their internal passports or other identification documents only if required for the implementation of their official obligations.

Article 9. (1) Housing and other premises occupied by citizens can be entered in the cases stipulated in Article 19 of the law after the purpose of such entry has been explained.

(2) Actions which are not required by the purpose of the entry and which infringe upon the honor and dignity of the occupants may not be committed in entering housing or other premises occupied by citizens.

(3) Penetration of premises of establishments and projects for which a particular entry procedure has been established, or of units of the armed forces may take place only in accordance with proper procedure.

Article 10. (1) In the cases stipulated in Article 24, paragraph 1, of the law should the use of physical force prove to be ineffective, the personnel of the officer, sergeant, and rank and file personnel of the people's militia may use the following auxiliary facilities: handcuffs, straight jackets, or rubber clubs.

(2) The procedure for the use of such auxiliary means, as well as the cases in which they may be used toward minors shall be based on an instruction issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs, coordinated with the Prosecutor General.

(3) No auxiliary means may be used on juveniles, pregnant women, or the elderly.

Article 11. (1) A written statement shall be drawn up describing the circumstances which required the use of auxiliary means or weapons for each separate case of use of physical force, auxiliary means, or weapons.

(2) The names of citizens taken by force to a people's militia unit or a people's council shall be entered in a special record book. A document shall be issued on the citizen's request.

Article 12. (1) The following shall be considered important and urgent official tasks in the course of which the personnel of the officer, sergeant, and rank and file membership of the people's militia may make use of transportation and communication facilities as per Article 27 of the law: capture of an individual in flight, committed crime, providing emergency aid in the case of fires, floods, and other natural or social catastrophes, as well as first aid to casualties.

(2) The cost of the used private transportation and communication facilities shall be paid by the people's militia units on the basis of a document issued by the official who used them. The document shall list the full name of the owner, registration number of the transportation vehicle, the duration of the use of the transportation or communication facility, the reason, the route, and the full name of the people's militia official and his unit.

(3) A document as per the preceding paragraph shall be issued also to the drivers of state, cooperative, or public transportation vehicles as justification for such expenditures.

(4) Drivers of diplomatic, military, or foreign vehicles may only be asked to take victims to the closest medical institution for rendering first medical aid.

Chapter Three

Organization, Personnel, and Material Support

of the People's Militia

Article 13. The Minister of Internal Affairs shall approve the structure and tables of organization of the people's militia units. He shall open and close structural units within the limits of the personnel, number of administrations, and wage fund approved by the Council of Ministers.

Article 14. In their activities as per Article 47 of the law the territorial people's militia units shall be also under the jurisdiction of the respective people's councils and operate as authorities under twin jurisdiction.

Article 15. The People's Militia Directorate shall head and control all territorial people's militia units, including obshtina and departmental militia.

Article 16. (1) People's militia personnel shall be appointed or dismissed as follows:

1. Officers--by the Minister of Internal Affairs;
2. Sergeants and rank and file personnel and administrative-technical and auxiliary personnel--by the director of the people's militia or, respectively, the chief of the unit in which they serve.

(2) The people's militia heads of territorial units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs shall be appointed with the agreement of the executive committees of the respective people's councils.

(3) The rayon people's militia inspectors shall be appointed with the approval of the executive committees of the respective people's councils where they are centered.

Article 17. (1) Orders for the dismissal of sergeant and rank and file people's militia personnel may be appealed within two weeks' time of their submission to the Minister of Internal Affairs who shall issue a decision within one month.

(2) Petitions for review of orders dismissing junior and senior people's militia officers shall be submitted and considered within the deadlines stipulated in the preceding paragraph.

Article 18. (1) Commissions, promotions or demotions of individuals as per Article 34, paragraph 2, of the law shall take place as follows:

1. Of students--by the commanding officer of the respective school;
2. Of sergeants and rank and file personnel--by the director of the people's militia or, respectively, the chief of the unit in which they serve.

(2) This Article shall also regulate posthumous promotions.

Article 19. The officer, sergeant, and rank and file personnel of the people's militia shall wear uniforms and specific insignia approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs with the approval of the Minister of National Defense.

Article 20. The officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel shall be issued weapons in accordance with their assignments.

Article 21. (1) The officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel shall be paid wages based on position and rank, additional rewards, food and material supplies, and others, in the amounts stipulated by the Council of Ministers.

(2) The people's military administrative-technical and auxiliary personnel shall be paid wages and additional rewards based on the amounts stipulated for the civil departments, as well as additional payments for work in the people's militia, as stipulated by the Council of Ministers.

(3) People's militia students shall be paid wages based on position and rank.

Article 22. The officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel may be awarded moral, monetary, or material rewards as per the Ukaze on Spiritual Incentives.

Article 23. The officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel engaged in work harmful to the health or of a special nature shall have a working day in accordance with the stipulations of the Labor Code.

Article 24. Pregnant women of the officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel, working under harmful or difficult conditions, shall be given other positions within seven days following proof of pregnancy in accordance with the stipulations and procedures of the Labor Code.

Article 25. (1) The officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel shall use public urban transportation facilities (excluding taxicabs) free of charge in the performance of their official duties.

(2) The officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel serving at railway and water transportation facilities shall travel free of charge aboard trains or ships in the areas covered by their assignments in the course of the implementation of their official duties.

Article 26. (1) The following time shall be taken into consideration in granting additional payments for length of service, additional paid leave and one-time monetary compensations or bonuses for length of service in the people's militia:

1. The time of service in officer and sergeant positions as reenlisted personnel in the armed forces, State Security, Construction Troops, troops of the Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Communications, and the Prisons Directorate (Department) of the Ministry of Justice and its units after 9 September 1944, or service in the Soviet Army and the militia of the USSR.

2. Service in the anti-fascist guerrilla detachments and other anti-fascist armed forces in the country or abroad;

3. Sentences served in fascist jails by political prisoners, or in concentration camps, the time spent by officials as political exiles, interneers, or clandestine workers, or in paid clandestine revolutionary work prior to 9 September 1944;

4. Service as members of the firefighting and officer (commanding) personnel in the fire-prevention service after 9 September 1944;

5. Length of service in civilian positions and professions.

(2) The time served as per point five of the preceding paragraph shall be converted in a ratio of five years for third category, four years for second category, and three year for first category into the equivalent of four years served in the people's militia.

(3) Service as per point five of paragraph one shall be taken into consideration in receiving a one-time monetary compensation in the case of dismissal and for the use of additional leave, and if the official has worked no less than 10 years in the people's militia either separately or together with the time honored as per Articles one through four of paragraph one.

Article 27. The officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel and reserve personnel may be listed as perpetual members of units in which they have served or may have their names entered in the honor roll of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for displayed heroism, by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs.

Article 28. The officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel who died in the course of or as a result of the implementation of their official duties shall be buried with proper honors.

Article 29. The procedure for service by the officer, sergeant, and rank and file people's militia personnel, as well as rewards and disciplinary penalties and conditions governing their application shall be determined by directives issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs.

Chapter Four

Obshtina Militia

Article 30. (1) An obshtina militia shall be set up at obshtina people's councils in settlements whose conditions require it.

(2) The obshtina militia shall carry out the legal assignments of the people's militia on the territory of the respective obshtina.

(3) In exceptional cases such as mass ceremonies, festivals, or natural or social catastrophes, and so on, by permission of the chief of the okrug

MVR administration or of the people's militia director, with the agreement of the chairman of the executive committee of the respective people's council, the obshtina militia may be used also outside the territory of the obshtina or the okrug.

Article 31. The obshtina militia shall have the duties and rights of the general militia in carrying out its assignments.

Article 32. (1) The upkeep of the obshtina militia shall be provided out of the budgets of the people's councils based on general militia norms; a two percent supplement shall be paid for the maintenance of the officer personnel needed for overall militia management and control.

(2) The Ministry of Finance shall transfer specific credits from the budgets of the people's councils for the maintenance of the obshtina militia, homes for the temporary placement of minors and juveniles, homes for temporary placement of adults, children's pedagogical offices and sobering institutions to the budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in a separate account.

Article 33. The obshtina militia shall be set up or disbanded by proposal submitted by the chairman of the executive committee of the respective okrug people's council and the chief of the territorial unit of the people's militia, by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs, with the approval of the Committee for Labor and Wages and the Ministry of Finance.

Article 34. The obshtina militia personnel shall be trained at courses organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and financed out of maintenance credits.

Article 35. The obshtina militia personnel may use the rest homes and housing facilities of both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the respective people's councils.

Chapter Five

Departmental Militia

Article 36. (1) The departmental militia shall protect its assigned projects and insure the maintenance of public order in them. In the performance of such assignments the departmental militia shall have the rights and obligations of the general militia.

(2) In exceptional cases, by permission of the director of the people's militia, and the approval of the heads of the corresponding establishments or economic or other organizations in which it operates, the departmental militia may be used also for carrying out assignments outside of its entrusted projects after taking the necessary measures for their protection.

Article 37. The protection objects and departmental militia personnel shall be determined by the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the approval of the Ministry of Finance and the respective ministry or other department.

Article 38. (1) A contract shall be signed between the People's Militia Directorate and the respective establishment, or economic or other organization for the creation of a departmental militia.

(2) The contract shall stipulate the obligations of the parties on the protection of the project, the size of the personnel, material, technical, and financial support, expenditures for personnel training and the equipment of the project in connection with its protection, and the time for the transfer of funds for the upkeep of the departmental militia. Disputes on the conclusion and execution of contracts shall be resolved by superior authorities.

(3) A copy of the contract shall be issued to the territorial people's militia unit in whose area the protected project is located, as well as to the project manager.

(4) Changes in departmental militia personnel shall be cleared with the Ministry of Finance and the respective ministry or other department without drawing up a new contract.

Article 39. The protection of sites by departmental militia shall be undertaken following the fulfillment of the obligations stipulated in the contract on the equipment of the projects and the providing of material facilities for departmental militia personnel.

Article 40. The officer, sergeant, and rank and file personnel needed for protecting a site by departmental militia shall be based on the nature and importance of the project and the number of posts and routes based on general militia norms.

Article 41. The departmental militia personnel shall be trained at courses organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Article 42. The departmental militia shall be headed by its commanders and the chiefs of the respective territorial people's militia units.

Article 43. The heads of establishments, and economic and other organizations protected by departmental militia may submit suggestions to the territorial people's militia units aimed at improving their protection. In the case of irregularities they shall inform the chief of the territorial people's militia unit.

Article 44. (1) The upkeep of the departmental militia shall be based on the norms and regulations formulated by the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and the chairman of the Committee for Labor and

Wages. The amount of two percent shall be added to the overall sum for the upkeep of the personnel for expenditures related to the general management and control of the departmental militia by the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

(2) Departmental militia personnel operating under adverse or other specific conditions shall receive additional wages and issued anti-toxins in accordance with the procedure, conditions, and amounts stipulated for the administrative-management personnel of the protected site.

(3) Funds for the upkeep of the departmental militia shall be transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs within the deadlines stipulated in the contract. In the case of delinquency the amounts owed shall be collected on the basis of a payment order.

(4) Establishments, and economic and other organizations guarded by departmental militia shall submit for its requirements properly equipped official premises, inventory, transportation vehicles, and communications and technical facilities based on the approved norms for the people's militia, and shall bear the costs of their utilization and repairs.

Article 45. Departmental militia personnel shall use the rest homes and housing facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the establishments, and economic and other organizations in which departmental militia operates.

Chapter Six

Departmental Guards

Article 46. (1) If necessary, the managers of establishments, or economic or other organizations and individual sites without departmental militia may organize their protection by guards, controlled and assisted by the people's militia.

(2) The departmental guards shall protect their assigned sites and maintain the public order within them. They may be armed or unarmed.

Article 47. (1) The type of departmental guards shall be determined by the respective ministries or other departments or organizations as requested by the managements of the sites under their jurisdiction.

(2) The opinion of the respective territorial people's militia unit shall be sought in determining the type of guards, posts, and number of personnel.

Article 48. The departmental guards shall be headed by the managers of the guarded sites. They shall organize measures for the training of the departmental guards.

Article 49. (1) Departmental armed guards may be hired or dismissed by the managers of the guarded sites with the consent of the chiefs of the territorial people's militia units.

(2) Individuals 20 years old or older physically able to perform guard service may be appointed departmental guards.

Article 50. (1) Departmental guards shall be issued weapons and ammunition by the respective territorial units of the people's militia in accordance with the procedure and norms stipulated by the Minister of Internal Affairs.

(2) Departmental guards shall wear uniforms approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs.

(3) The material supplies of departmental guards shall be determined by the Council of Ministers.

(4) If necessary guard dogs whose upkeep will be met by the protected site may be used.

Article 51. The managers of establishments and economic and other organizations protected by departmental guards may combine guard duty under a single management with the concurrence of the respective people's militia unit.

Article 52. Departmental guards may not be used for work unrelated to the fulfillment of their official duties.

Chapter Seven

Signaling-Protection Equipment

Article 53. The people's militia may use signaling-protection equipment in protecting individual sites, establishments, and economic and other organizations.

Article 54. (1) The use of signaling-protection equipment shall be based on a contract stipulating duties related to its installation, maintenance, and utilization, as well as the period of time and the time of day for guard duty.

(2) Following the necessary studies the contract shall be signed by the head of the respective establishment or economic or other organization, and the chief of the territorial people's militia unit. Contract related controversies shall be resolved by their superior authorities.

(3) Protection involving signaling-protection equipment may be provided for private citizens' homes as well on a contractual basis.

(4) Annual dues shall be paid for the installation, maintenance, and utilization of signaling-protection equipment; they shall be deposited to the non-budget account of the Ministry of Internal Affairs within the contractual deadline.

(5) The payments stipulated in the preceding paragraph shall be based on indicators approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of Finance based on the type of site and protection time. In the case of delinquency such funds shall be collected with a payment order.

Article 55. (1) The Ministry of Communications shall issue territorial people's militia units, against payment, regular and extension telephone sets for the guarded sites as well as slots in the premises of automatic telephone exchanges for connecting signaling-protection equipment facilities.

(2) The necessary premises for switchboards and central systems for signaling-protection equipment installed in settlements shall be provided by the respective people's councils.

Article 56. Within the limits of the funds deposited in the non-budget account the Minister of Internal Affairs may open, in addition to the ceiling established for the ministry, additional positions for officer, sergeant, administrative-technical and auxiliary personnel for the organization, maintenance, and utilization of signaling-protection equipment and supply technical facilities.

Article 57. (1) Damages caused as a result of thefts in sites protected by signaling-protection equipment shall be compensated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs out of its non-budget account funds providing that the necessary measures have not been taken by the people's militia and the theft has not been detected within a six-month period.

(2) The damages stipulated in the preceding paragraph caused to banks, savings banks, museums, painting galleries with valuable items, and sites in which items of great value are stored shall be compensated to an amount not to exceed annual payments for the protection of the site multiplied by five.

Article 58. The cost estimate documents for the construction or reconstruction of projects in which items of great value are stored shall include the cost of signaling-protection equipment.

Chapter Eight

Interaction Between the People's Militia and the Other State Authorities and the Public

Article 59. The people's militia shall perform its assignments in close cooperation and interaction with the organs of the prosecutor's office and the courts and engage in joint measures in the struggle against crime and, particularly, against attempts on socialist property.

Article 60. (1) The people's militia shall cooperate with the state and public authorities and organizations and engage in joint measures with them to explain socialist laws, prevent crimes and other anti-state actions, and mobilize the efforts of labor collectives and citizens for the protection of socialist property and the maintenance of public order.

(2) If necessary the people's militia authorities shall ask the heads of establishments, and economic and other organizations to take measures to influence individuals who allow violations of the public order or whose actions and behavior are the cause for conditions for the commission of crimes or other anti-social actions.

Article 61. (1) The people's militia shall plan and implement measures insuring the fulfillment of plans for the socioeconomic development of the people's council pertaining to the maintenance of public order and the observance of socialist legality.

(2) The people's militia shall actively assist the people's councils, their executive committees, and other state and public authorities and organizations in their efforts to enhance the legal awareness of the citizens, their upbringing in a spirit of mutual respect and conscientious implementation of the laws, and the creation of an atmosphere of social intolerance toward delinquencies.

Article 62. The people's militia shall assist in the building of centers for educational work at the places of residence of individuals tending to engage in anti-social actions, and shall actively assist such centers in their work.

Article 63. Within the limits of their competence the people's militia authorities shall assist the people's councilors in the implementation of their public duties.

Article 64. (1) The people's militia territorial units shall report on their activities at sessions of the people's councils and to their representatives as per Article 47 of the law, as well as on their activities to maintain traffic safety, and on the observance of socialist laws and the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens, and shall submit suggestions on improvements.

(2) The people's militia rayon inspectors shall report on their activities and condition of the maintenance of public order on the territory of their rayon to the executive committees of the respective people's councils.

Article 65. If necessary the people's militia shall report to party, state, and public authorities on matters pertaining to public order, the situation with and dynamics of crimes, anti-social actions, and other delinquencies, the observance of socialist legality, and the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens.

Article 66. (1) The people's councils shall grant free of charge properly equipped premises for children's pedagogical rooms, homes for temporary placement of minors and juveniles, homes for temporary placement of adults, and disintoxication institutions, as well as motor vehicles, communications, and other technical facilities based on people's militia norms, and shall meet their overall running costs.

(2) The people's councils shall grant free of charge suitable and properly equipped premises to the rayon people's militia inspectors, as well as the necessary communications and other technical facilities.

Article 67. The Ministry of Transportation shall provide suitable premises, furnishings, transportation, communications, and other technical facilities for the people's militia units serving transportation facilities, and shall meet the cost of their utilization and maintenance.

Additional and Concluding Stipulations

#1. In the sense of #3 of the concluding stipulations of the law the supervisory-field personnel shall include the officer, sergeant, and rank and file personnel of the Prisons Directorate of the Ministry of Justice and its units.

#2. The present regulation is issued on the basis of #4 of the concluding stipulations of the Law on the People's Militia (DV, number 89, 1976).

#3. The present regulation shall be effective as of 1 March 1977 and shall replace:

1. The Regulation on the obshtina militia (DV, number 37, 1970);
2. The Regulation on the departmental militia (DV, number 55, 1966);
3. The Regulation on the Signaling-Protection Equipment, approved by Order Number 359 of the Council of Ministers, dated 1 August 1970;
4. The Regulation on Departmental Protection by Guards (DV, number 2, 1971);

5. Order Number 67 of the Council of Minister of 17 April 1966, section pertaining to the people's militia.

#4. The execution of the present regulation is assigned to the Minister of Internal Affairs.

5003

CSO: 2200

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BOHEMIAN BRETHREN DETAIL REASONS FOR SIGNING CHARTER 77

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Apr 77 p.3

/Text/ Frankfurt, 1 April. In Czechoslovakia copies of a letter are being passed from hand to hand in which ministers of the Evangelical Church of Bohemian Brethren are explaining why they are among the original signers of Charter 77. Other church members of the Bohemian Brethren have since signed the Charter 77.

According to the mimeographed letter support for the human rights movement is rooted in history, politics and theology. In theology: The bible predicts the coming of the "Kingdom of God" known to every Christian from the Lord's Prayer: "Thy Kingdom Come." The ministers write that they see "a reflection of the redeeming power of God" in all places "where people are being liberated from oppression, exploitation, social and spiritual distress, from the slavery of fear and tyranny; where limits are being set to the arrogance and arbitrariness of the irresolute human heart; where the downtrodden are being uplifted."

The second reason is the historical heritage of the Czech Reformation, which resulted in the martyrdom of Master Hus a century before Luther's Wittenberg theses. Luther expressly acknowledged principal tenets of Hus' teachings in the Leipzig Disputation. The six Bohemian Brethren ministers write: The emphasis of our reformation on free preaching of the Word of God, its thoughts on religious tolerance and its respect for the beliefs of others" places the Church close to the initiatives for human rights.

Finally, the letter stresses the limits which are set to all political power. The ministers report: "One of the spokesmen of the Charter 77 expressed the thought that the world of politics was subordinated to a sovereign moral authority. This is understood in the light of Jesus' testimony before Pilate, the representative of political power. And we acknowledge this absolute authority of truth over us. In the past and in the present some Christians have left political power to its own resources, forgetting that the values which transcend politics apply to it also. We have neglected to point to the limits of political power and have at times substituted conformity for the attitude of critical responsibility.

The ministers claim to see nothing out of the ordinary in their signing of the Charter 77. It is "an expression of service to fellow men similar to a deep liberating discourse, responsible bible work, free preaching, intercession for and assistance to people in need within and outside the church community."

The ministers invoke the support of Christians in Czechoslovakia and abroad with the prayer: "These days we pledge to be thinking intensively about the community of the church. We believe that Christians at home and the world over will support our endeavors by prayer and deed."

8664

CSO: 2300

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

SITUATION OF HUNGARIAN MINORITY EXAMINED

Munich UJ LATOHATAR in Hungarian 15 Feb 77 pp 523-537

[Article by Dr Kalman Janics, an expert on minority questions who lives in Slovakia: "The Hungarian Minority in the CSSR"]

[Text] The CSSR is today a socialist federative republic in which the federation is formed by the Czech lands with a population of 10 million and Slovakia with a population of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million. Territorially, the Czech lands are about the same as the medieval Czech kingdom, which in 1620 passed under Hapsburg rule. Slovakia was born of the Trianon peace treaty and was formed after World War I by the separation of the northern part of Hungary, creating a new state together with the Czechs. As a result of the new boundary drawn between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, about 700,000 Hungarians living in the border areas of Slovakia passed under Czechoslovakia, but their number declined to 580,000 by 1930.

On the basis of area decisions in the Versailles-Trianon peace treaties, more than 3 million Hungarians after World War I became citizens of neighboring states (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia), and this situation — according to the results of censuses — has remained the same to this day. Thus the Hungarian national minorities are the largest of the approximately 20 million minority people in Europe — excluding the Soviet Union — or about 16 percent of the total. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia makes up about one-fifth of the Hungarian national minorities in the Danube area.

In Slovakia, the number of Hungarians declined at first between the two World Wars as a result of emigration and assimilation, but by the outbreak of World War II reached a total of 630,000 as a result of natural increase and cultural self-rediscovery. The overwhelming part of the area in which the Hungarians live was returned to Hungarian rule between 1938-1945 in the meaning of the Hitlerite Viennese award made on basis of the Munich Diktat. But the 1947 peace treaty restored the 1920 borders, and 650,000 Hungarians again became Czechoslovak citizens, that is, they would have become so had events developed otherwise.

It is the purpose of this study to examine the life of the Hungarian minority in the CSSR since World War II, but we cannot steer clear of references at times to interbellum relations.

In a postwar atmosphere that was filled with passions, it was an appealing and generally accepted but mistaken view that the national minorities were the cause of World War II, and therefore international protection for the national minorities was a matter that could be raised only at the risk of unpopularity. This strange antipathy toward national minorities, although general in the East and West alike, was neither justified nor just, for by now no one doubts that Hitler's war machine would have attacked sooner or later even without the East European German minority; on the other hand, it is difficult to accept the penalization of the minorities by total disregard because in final analysis they were not the cause of their own fate since they were created as byproducts of the Versailles peace treaty. After World War II, the national minorities problem was treated as a kind of "German interest" affair, and therefore the international agreements of the 1920's on minority protection were regarded as obsolete and invalid without their having been invalidated by any international law or declaration. At the 1947 peace conference, no one spoke of minority protection. After World War II, the implicit goal in problems involving national minorities — if the victorious powers had permitted this matter to be raised at all — was not minority protection, that is, preservation, which would have maintained the problem, but rather approval for reduction of the problem, and assimilation as soon as possible.

Nowhere was there evidence of willingness to differentiate between scattered immigrant ethnics and such minorities as were created not by migration but by border changes and who have lived in the same area in solid settlement blocs and were made into minorities only by a change of rule. Such a national minority is formed by the 3 million Hungarians in the Carpathian basin living at present outside the borders of Hungary, with their own compact settlement relations, collective national consciousness, local and historical traditions, and with the will, which derives from all this, to continue maintaining their language and culture. After World War II, they expected these historical national minorities to be assimilated within two-three generations like the West European or American immigrants. However, as we shall make clear in the present study, the national minorities, including the Hungarian society in Slovakia, were of different mind, and they still are.

The postwar national policy of the East European states to the mid-1960's followed the formula, now regarded as dogmatic, that after the socialist revolutionary transformation of society the national minorities problem would resolve itself. Since then, others have examined it and arrived at the conclusion that the coexistence of two or more peoples is not only an economic projection or a question of the human rights of individuals but also the synthesis of a thousand different colors in overall social activity which must be blended in some form. Of what use is it to have every political and economic condition for coexistence if an atmosphere of confidence is lacking among individual peoples and minor and major threats are hindering an integration beautifully conceived in theory?

Nowadays, nationality problems in Eastern Europe are handled in as many different ways as there are socialist states, for everywhere the problems are approached according to domestic traditions, interests and biases, and rather in the abstract than with detailed coordination of interests.

Independent of legally definable human and minority rights, the marrow of the minority problem today remains the determination of those factors which constrain a citizen of minority nationality to give up his nationality. In examining the countries of the Danube area, primarily of course the CSSR, we find that economic achievement has been put into the background as the suggester of nationality change, and in its place we have the quantitative and qualitative lag in schools and the decline in the level of national culture. This includes mixed marriages and internal migration as an assimilation factor.

Understandably, in approaching the nationality question, certain principles are stressed by those majority peoples which want to assimilate, and different positions are adhered to by minorities which wish to save their language and culture. Most of the pro and con arguments of theoretical considerations seek to have an effect by actualizing quotations taken from the Marxist classicists. (In Slovakia, for example, the majority people removed from the agenda the effort of the Hungarian minority to determine its own cultural needs with the help of some type of organs by referring to a quotation from Lenin, who rejected cultural autonomy under entirely different circumstances at the turn of the century.

The central question of the nationality efforts in the Danube area is not human rights and the right to cultivate one's mother tongue, or even equality before the law; rather it is the right to maintain the mother tongue at a certain quality level, protection against fading, dilution, and becoming a kitchen language. Where there is no college in the mother tongue, society must make up the cultivation of college level education and the fostering of the standard learned language; otherwise language deterioration becomes general, intellectuals will speak the mother tongue only at a secondary school level, and loan words will make up the specialized expressions lacking in the mother tongue.

The favorite argument of the majority peoples is the classical socialist view that the world will move in the direction of one language after the socialist revolution becomes general, and this process can best be promoted if smaller groups of people are assimilated into the larger national units as soon as possible. Sindelka² puts it this way that in the first round mutual antagonisms will cease; in the second round the two nations will come to know each other; and in the third round they will merge, that is, the smaller fragments of people will take over the national culture of the greater. This is how Sindelka interprets the merging of peoples. He cannot have any other notion because a mutual learning to know each other does not even exist, for example, in the CSSR; it is one-sided, only the Hungarian minority learns the Slovak language and culture whereas the Hungarian language is taught nowhere to Slovaks; even Slovak historians do not know

Hungarian although the two peoples had a common history for a thousand years. That is to say, we cannot even speak of "mutual" recognition.

Sindelka disapproves of minority defense against assimilation and calls it bourgeois nationalism if the minority "...wants to maintain its nationality isolation, to preserve its nationality separateness, support national development at every cost, without regard to the trend toward rapprochement among nations."³ Of course, the national minorities regard this apparently appealing theory with aversion because they feel that they are the ones who must sacrifice their all — language, culture, traditions — as the first step to serve the assimilation efforts of the majority people through the force of others' utopian notions.

Not only in the learning-to-know phase are there traps, but also in the mutual removal of antagonism. This is understandable because the majority people has disproportionally greater opportunities for preserving antagonism not only on basis of size but its power position. Attempts at keeping alive anti-pathies against the nationalities are regular (also in the field of school education). In 1972, for example, a book was published in Slovakia which approves of every excess in persecuting the Magyars⁴ despite the fact that in the past the Slovak Communist Party repeatedly condemned these methods in its resolutions.

A historical introduction is necessary to understand the present situation because — with the exception of the Germans — it was the Hungarian minority in Slovakia which paid the most serious price for post-World War II revenge as a consequence of Czechoslovakia's discriminatory policy, which had the goal of liquidating the Hungarian ethnic population by means of forced transfer. In support of the transfer policy, a whole series of laws expressly deprived the Hungarian minority of civil rights, all Hungarian culture was prohibited, and general confiscation of property was provided for. They did not succeed in carrying out the latter, but every manifestation of culture, school, press, literature, etc., was totally eliminated for 3½ years. As a consequence, the educational intellectuals fled to Hungary so that when the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was able to breathe again in the spring of 1949, the national culture had to be rebuilt from nothing and it required years before the school system could be developed anew. Without doubt, those who undertook this reinitiation of Hungarian culture gained undying merit.

Despite the favorable development, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia suffered a serious blow with the population exchange agreement which Hungary signed under big-power pressure and which was carried out in 1947 and 1948 and in the framework of which 68,000 Hungarians were forcibly transferred⁵ and 6,000 voluntarily. The population exchange was compulsory only for the Hungarians in Slovakia; the Slovaks in Hungary reported voluntarily, 73,000 of them; and therefore the signing of this agreement shocked the Hungarians in Slovakia. In 1947, there were 170,000 Slovaks living in Hungary, and after the exchange 110,000. Before the exchange of population was carried out, 45,000 Hungarians were transferred in the winter of 1946-1947 to the Czechoslovak Sudeten provinces as agricultural servants, and their real estate property and agricultural equipment were confiscated. (Later, they were permitted to return to their native land.)

The purpose of the population exchange was to eliminate the Hungarian ethnic population, a goal which was achieved in part; the entirely Hungarian-speaking areas became linguistically mixed, and the places of the approximately 12 percent Hungarians who were transferred were taken by Slovaks from Hungary. The success of the program is not too convincing by now, because a part of the Slovaks who were brought in have left their place of residence, and the smaller fragments have been assimilated into the Hungarian population. It is a fact, however, that the population changed at least 150 villages which up to 1946 were entirely Magyar-speaking into linguistically mixed communities.

The ousting of the Hungarian minority in 1946 from the agrarian area was not a new idea because the post-World War I land reform also had expressly national goals when Slovak village settlements were established on expropriated large estates in the Magyar areas. This view of land reform was justified then, too, by national interests: "Unlike in the Czech provinces, the land reform in Slovakia inevitably had a much more definite national emphasis, and it had to be linked with the movement toward the south by the Slovak population which was of national interest."⁶

It would exceed the limits of this study if we tried to detail every part of the situation, demographically or culturally. Therefore, we only wish to expose with the illumination of lightning whatever is necessary for an approximate perception of the clear picture.

First of all, a certain comparison is inevitable with the situation of the Hungarian minority in the interbellum period. It must be stated that at the cultural level, the situation of the then Hungarian minority was more favorable than that of the present because a greater ratio of those subject to compulsory education went to Hungarian-language schools (about 90 percent) than now (about 80 percent). While the reading requirement was narrower, there were more book publishers, the cultivation of the mother tongue was at a higher level in secondary schools, social and literary periodicals were published in addition to large-circulation newspapers, and there was a learned association (the Masaryk Academy). From a historical perspective and as a contemporary witness, I may summarize this cultural situation with the statement that by and large it was equal with the cultural situation of the Slovaks. On the other hand, one cannot even speak, at the economic level, of the collective equality of the Hungarian minority.

To prove inequality both in the economic and state administrative fields, it is sufficient to note two items of data according to the 1930 census on basis of Holotikova's article⁷: among every thousand Slovak who was employed, 181.8 were day laborers (proletarians) and 67.9 were officials as compared among the Hungarians to 245.5 day laborers and only 40.3 officials in every thousand.

Under the present socialist system, the situation has been reversed. The Hungarian citizen may be regarded as equal to the Slovak citizen in the

CSSR's economic activity, living standards, as well as state and economic management, but on the other hand second class status exists in the cultural area, which we shall detail below. That is to say, the cultural equality and economic inequality has been changed for the nationality citizens to economic equality and a definite cultural inequality. This in itself refutes the dogmatic theory of automatism which asserts that the problem of national minorities need not be solved for the revolutionary transformation of the class question as well as economic development will assure every nation — therefore the minorities, too — of equality.

In searching for the causes of the present negative phenomena, let us not lose sight of the fact that we cannot decipher the history of Hungarian society in Slovakia in the past quarter of a century simply from official columns of figures because the development of the delivery of the Hungarian minority is influenced in addition biological, economic and cultural factors by such political and official measures which did not derive from life conditions, which the society was accustomed to and regarded as regular. The postwar social structure was not changed as a consequence of natural law but as a result of the interplay of forced mobility (forcible resettlement, fragmentation, property expropriation, complete cultural deprivation, voluntary flight, a panic atmosphere lasting for years and stemming from terrorization, etc.).

When the situation of the Hungarian minority was clarified, however, in 1948 and the members of the remaining population were again recognized as citizens, the slow rise began, but the more important results become convincing only after the lapse of a decade. In the 1950 census, only 350,000 Hungarians dared to declare their nationality before the commissioners of registration, but in 1961 the number of Hungarians leaped above $\frac{1}{2}$ million, which was not only the result of natural increase but primarily of release from terrorization.

Development was not smooth even at the economic level. The Hungarian areas were characterized by a lag in industries; with the end of World War II, 60 percent of the Hungarian population lived from agriculture. By 1950, the ratio of those living from agriculture declined to 55 percent. With the development of industry, 40 percent of the Hungarians in 1961 lived from agriculture, but only 34.7 percent in 1970. Despite this, the Hungarian ethnic population is still largely of agrarian character.

The 1961 census also shows that in the first 15 years of the postwar period the share of the Hungarians in political and economic leadership, as well as in services, lagged greatly behind that of the Slovaks (when all the heritage of the postwar crisis years still was in effect) whereas there was a labor surplus of Hungarians in agriculture as a consequence of which female employment was substantially behind that of Slovak women. Another disadvantageous circumstance was that considerably fewer Hungarians than Slovaks continued school after the age of 14 years.

A substantial improvement occurred between 1961 and 1970 which is reflected in the figures for the 1970 census. Accordingly, as we have already mentioned, the Hungarian ethnic population remained primarily an agrarian society with 34.7 percent of the Hungarians living from agriculture and 18.6 percent of the Slovak society. (Parallel with this, 35.2 percent of the Slovak employees were in industry and only 22.8 percent of the Hungarian.) It is striking in the structure of the Hungarian population that a latent labor surplus is still evident since 5 percent fewer Hungarians engage in economic activity than Slovaks (45 percent of the Slovak population is employed, 40 percent of the Hungarian); and in addition the ratio of Hungarian women not employed is disproportionately high.

Something of a lag is also evident to the disadvantage of the Hungarians in nonproducing economic activities. While 20 percent of the Slovaks are engaged in services and state administration, the Hungarians attained only 15 percent in this branch, which can also be explained, however, by the agricultural character of the people. In comparison to the 1961 census, the 1971 data show a development also in this area.

The depression years had the least disturbing effect on natural increase, and it is due to this that until the 1960's the Hungarian minority increased by 5,000 persons annually. The ratio of live births until 1961 was relatively high, 27 per thousand, with a natural increase of 14 per thousand. In the 1960's live births decreased rapidly, and stabilized at 16 per thousand by 1970, with a death rate of 10 per thousand. (Live births among Slovaks was 19 per thousand in 1970, with a death rate of 10 per thousand.)

An examination of the level of live births needs to include a comparison of age groups. According to the last two censuses, 1961 and 1970, Slovaks under 14 years of age in 1961 made up 32.3 percent of the total Slovak society, while only 27.8 percent of the Hungarians. By 1970, the ratio of Slovaks under 14 years of age fell to 26.9 percent and the Hungarian ratio to 24.5 percent. (We should note that the ratio of Czech youths under 14 years of age is 21.3 percent among the Czechs, who are barely increasing in population.)

It is particularly important to study those Hungarian age groups where we can establish (such statistical data are not published) the number of Hungarians of school age and compare this with the number of pupils in the Hungarian general schools. In 1970, the number of Hungarians of school age between the ages of 6-14 years was 86,000, whereas there were only 69,000 Hungarian pupils in the general basic schools, that is to say, about 17,000 Hungarians of school age did not attend school in their mother tongue, or 19 to 20 percent of the Hungarians of school age. (A sociological survey in 1965 showed that 21 percent of Hungarians of school age were not in Hungarian schools.)

According to official statistical reports, the natural increase of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia in 1973 was 6-7 per thousand, or 4,200 persons annually; that is, the increase in the Hungarian population seems assured, for it is not likely that an assimilative erosion would develop equal to this

natural increase. This is also indicated by the fact that according to the 1970 census every southern Slovak jaras where there is a Hungarian majority or an important Hungarian minority, the Hungarian ethnic population is gaining both in absolute and relative terms. This needs to be emphasized because it was once in fashion to speak of the normal absorption of national minorities, and in fact anyone who had a different view, who wanted to maintain his heterogeneity, in opposition to the integration attempts of a socialist society, was regarded as belonging to an antisocial element.

Nowadays, the number of Hungarians in the CSSR is 580,000, of whom 20,000 live in the Czech lands. It needs to be mentioned that according to the 1970 census there are 52,000 Slovaks in Slovakia whose mother tongue is Hungarian, or who were Hungarian in their childhood, but changed their nationality to Slovak under the influence of school, environment, or mixed marriage. But it must also be pointed out that there were 4,000 Hungarians whose mother tongue was Slovak, that is to say, there is also a counter-assimilation, for some Slovaks become Hungarians in a Hungarian environment. The background cause in these cases is marriage and environment rather than school.

It is not a matter of indifference that 25 percent of the Hungarians who marry take non-Hungarian mates, but the overwhelming majority of these mixed marriages are in the urban industrial centers; their assimilative effect on the Hungarian agrarian ethnics is negligible.

It is an interesting demographic fact concerning the Hungarian minority that in the CSSR the number of divorces is lowest among Hungarians.

An unfavorable feature of Hungarian minority life is the scattering of a certain percentage of the population in the form of internal migration, which is in two directions, partly to settlement in the Czech lands and partly in the northern, industrial areas of Slovakia. The natural result of such internal migration is the rapid assimilation of the second generation in the Czech or Slovak ethnic population. The extent of the migration varies and in recent years it has declined as a consequence of the increasing industrialization of south Slovakia, and still the number of Hungarians who migrate annually may be put in the thousand, a half of which goes toward the Czech lands.

Protection of the Hungarian mother tongue is helped effectively by the settlement system of the Hungarian ethnic population. The Hungarians have an absolute majority in several hundred communities; according to the results of the 1970 Slovak census, there are 442 communities in Slovakia where more than one-half of the population is Hungarian, and 83 percent of the Hungarian minority lives in these places. There are 92 communities which are linguistically mixed, but the Hungarians are in a minority. In any event, we must regard as premature the views that the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is a nationality fragment that is dying out. Czech writers also emphasize the compactness of the Hungarian ethnic population: "The Hungarian population is concentrated mostly in the southern jarases of Slovakia, where it forms a continuous area."

The major characteristics of the Hungarian minorities in the Danube area is that they became minorities in the 20th century, they form compact blocs, and they have a historical and national consciousness. Laszlo Deme, the linguist from Hungary, sees the situation of the Hungarian minorities as follows: "The social group forms a natural bloc which lives compactly (that is, territorially in a relatively continuous area, and within the territory in relatively pure unity) and in a historical continuity in the area where they are found at present...Regardless how, the national blocs which in their present situation form a micro-society in their states — and in a larger unit, in the socialist bloc — must be reckoned with not only as a multitude of individuals but also as important communities."

With this, we have approached the cardinal point in the handling of the minority problem, namely, whether the national minorities have a subjectivity as a collective and whether they have a claim to collective rights, or whether it is necessary to rest satisfied with equality before the law and with other human rights or declarations assured to citizens. In the handling of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, we have not arrived at recognizing the subjectivity of nationality and minority communities. In its present state, the development resembles the international agreement on civil and political rights, which may start from recognizing collective existence, "those states where ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist" but switch immediately over to a declaration of exclusively individual rights, "persons belonging to this minority cannot be denied their rights, their group together with the other members may have their own cultural life, practice their own religion, and use their own language."

The gliding over from an initial collective concept to individual rights can be found in a similar illogical form in constitutional law 144/1968 which regulates the life of the CSSR national minorities and in its preamble starts out by stating that nationality also constitutes the state but the concrete listing of rights is limited to persons. Thus it is an open question whether the minority, as a collective, has the right of participation in development. Present practice adheres entirely to individual nationality rights, which is also made possible by the circumstance that no law or decree has appeared to carry out the principles of the constitution effective on 1 January 1969. In certain areas, the cultural situation of the nationality cannot be reconciled with the text of the constitutional law, and instead of harmony, notions are surfacing which recall the nationality policy of 1949-1955.

Detailed explanations are necessary justification for the observations. As we have shown, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia cannot be regarded as of second class status economically or in rising living standards. This has been made possible in part by the industrialization of south Slovakia and in part by the quality of the large-scale (cooperative) agricultural production of the Hungarian nationality, which in many places reaches the world level.

We must view differently, however, the problems of social organization which define the conditions of a society's culture and the establishment of the culture, where — we believe — the Hungarian minority is in a second class status and within a foreseeable period of time cannot improve its situation.

In connection with the problem of education, we have already indicated that compulsory schooling is narrower than it was in the first Czechoslovakia, that a greater percentage of Hungarians of school age do not attend schools in their mother tongue than was the case in the 1920's and 1930's. One reason for this is the still existing feeling of inferiority which is largely a heritage from postwar discrimination, but it is still also brought on by administrative vaults in present nationality policy. This is contributed to by the further disadvantageous situation that instruction in the mother tongue in the basic schools, and even in secondary schools, does not reach the desired level, that the network of specialized secondary schools is deficient, and the student in some places cannot attend a school in the mother tongue — for this very reason — even if an appropriate number of parents desire it.

The lack of a Hungarian university is a negative phenomenon, but it cannot even be demanded on basis of a serious weighing of the minority's numbers; without it, however, the learned vocabulary of the Hungarian language is languishing, the standard learned language is dying out, or is becoming a linguistic mixture. There is need for establishing learned associations which would maintain the learned standard even without a Hungarian university. Hungarian students in Slovakia are not allowed to enroll in universities in Hungary! A sociological association was being formed but came to an end; this was also the fate of the economics association. The historical association has remained alive, but little is heard of it; the members publish mostly in the Slovak language in Slovak specialized periodicals. The associations were formed in the framework of the Hungarian cultural federation "CSEMADOK"; but in recent years the view has risen that a cultural federation is not a learned association and cannot deal with social problems, and it cannot be of an interest-safeguard character. Therefore, according to its present mission, its operation is limited largely to folklore and mass political education. (It must be noted at the same time, however, that the federations of national minorities in Hungary have been declared interest-safeguard organs, and the Czechoslovak "Gypsy Federation" also emphasizes the safeguarding of interests.)

This situation developed in a way that has left the Hungarian minority at the present moment without a collective organ. ("CSEMADOK" cannot deal with problems involving the safeguarding of national minority interests.) The situation may be expected to improve only if the constitutional law is carried out, article 5 of which reads: "The laws on national councils together will determine, in addition to the representative bodies and executive organs that exist, the organs which will assure the validation of national rights." (Today, there are only mixed nationality organs on which the Hungarians are in the minority.)

Until 1970, the Hungarian cultural federation had a cultural and social role (the nationality constitutional law assures "the right of association in cultural-social organizations") and it was a member of the National Front, and together with this could participate indirectly in the exercise of power. Since 1971, the cultural federation has also ceased to be a "social" federation, membership in the National Front came to an end, and as an exclusively cultural organization it came under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, and thus its social, nationality, interest-safeguard, and scientific role ended. This retrogression cannot be adapted to the general trend of advancement, it is a return to the nationality policy of the first half of the 1950's. In Hungary, Laszlo Kovago¹⁰ judges the national policy of the 1950's as follows: "There was a general opinion that the nationality federations had been degraded into ministerial organs" ... "The central leadership of the Hungarian Workers Party stated that they should become more active in all areas of political and social life... Since then, the federations as associate organs of the Patriotic People's Front work actively in a dual political and cultural framework." That is, in the past 3 years, the development of a nationality policy has moved in an opposite direction in the CSSR from what it has in Hungary. What Hungary condemned as an error was one of the characteristics of a new chapter of the nationality policy in the CSSR since 1970.

We may consider that, at least quantitatively speaking, the Hungarian Minority in Slovakia is well supplied with periodic literature. However, there is no socio-political press, and on the learned level there is only a popular information periodical. It would do no harm to quote the statement made by the editor of LETUNK, the learned periodical of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia which consists of 550,000 persons, smaller than the Slovak minority: "Hungarian opinion in Yugoslavia can manifest itself with the demands of learned thinking."

Literature is developing and attaining noteworthy results. But in journalism there is no possibility for an objectively learned examination of the accumulation of problems touching directly on the future of the Hungarian minority like, for example, a detailed exposure of developments in the school problem, sociological data processing, open defense against the nationalist errors of the majority people, not to speak of "trifles" like the prohibition against mentioning historical Hungarian name of cities where the Hungarians do not live. In addition to the lag in realizing constitutional nationality rights, this narrowing of the culture determines the cultural inequality. This second class status does not derive from the socialist system but partly from the constant reactivation of postwar nationalism and partly from the preservation of antagonisms, which could be eliminated by consistently carrying out the constitutional law on nationality.

The actual or assumed nationalism of national minorities in the southeast European areas is everywhere of the same hue and character, according to the historical and geographical background and partly in proportion to the nationalistic atmosphere of the majority by which it is affected. The latter can appear in the form of dogmatic distortion, as the Budapest historian Pal Pach Zsigmond states: "...unfortunately, practice itself, life itself

shows us, whether we look at our neighbors or to the distant East, how sharp and how (sadly) convincing are the forms which link sectarian dogmatism and nationalism" (KORTARS, January 1974).

In examining the nationalism of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, we must proceed from the historical beginning. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia, which was created as a consequence of the new borders, was faced by two facts: it no longer belonged to a nation that could have supremacy over other peoples, that is, the potential assimilator became a society that feared extinction. The other unfavorable turn was brought on by the change of rule itself as a consequence of which about 100,000 Hungarian intellectuals, voluntarily or under compulsion, left Slovakia and resettled in Hungary. Not only was it necessary to maintain the historical national consciousness with a diminished Hungarian intelligentsia but also to reevaluate views held previously and explain to the masses that solidarity with the new state had to be undertaken in some form. The intelligentsia of the time solved this task successfully in respect to the circumstances, and this was supported alike by international agreements on the safeguard of minorities and the conciliatory gestures of the Czechoslovak state. But the intelligentsia was definitely incapable of interpreting the cultural values and national traditions of the majority — and now ruling — Slovak people, and thus a situation quickly arose in which Hungarian society saw only the growing self-consciousness of the new ruling people and its occupation of territory, and at the same time felt its own disablement, but it received no explanation for the new form of life. It is undeniable that under the ashes the embers of class and nationality dissatisfaction were red hot. (In political elections, the Hungarian votes in support of the government never exceeded 20 percent.) The faults of the power system also contributed to making loyalty to the new state merely an external mask, and thus in 1938 it was easy to topple the internal balance.

Therefore, the 20-year heritage of the interbellum period — if we are speaking of minority nationalism — was nothing more than the memory of opposition and separatism. The experience of the postwar persecution of the Hungarians belongs here, the frightening swell of which is still a driving force; we see examples by the thousands of attitudes caused by the prejudices of fear. It cannot be debated that the national consciousness was burdened with the feeling of second class status, and in fact it is still the suspicion today that the postwar situation may be renewed, the condition of nationality outside the law may return, and this is the main reason of the split with the past by those who flee into indifference in opposition to national traditions.

Such minority nationalism which injures the majority nation — in Slovakia the Slovaks — and denies its rights does not exist, nor can it. But as a function of unsolved problems, it is natural that emotional elements can nourish aversion to the majority people and preserve isolation in the case of bilingualism. In final analysis, it is not the knowing or not knowing of a language that determines isolation or confrontation with another people, but the emotional charge which builds on the memories of the past and the conflicts of the present.

It is painful for Hungarian public opinion in Slovakia that the evaluation of historical traditions, the class-oriented explanation of past events in problems of progress and reaction led exactly in the analysis of critical revolutionary times to permanent contradictions between Hungarian and Slovak historians (1848-1849, 1945-1948). All this comes as a chaotic projection of myths into the consciousness of the Hungarian minority and contributes to bringing about the fading and shrinking of the national consciousness in which a significant role is played by the fact that historical education in its entirety is built on the events of World War II, selecting out of the Hungarian past the 900-year-old Hungarian literary tradition. The narrowing of national consciousness is the hotbed of indifference, which is at first national but later becomes general and extends to everything. The result of an ambiguous education is the nervous condition of national nihilism, which is not exactly suitable to solidifying socialist patriotism and which could have been precisely the goal of the mass education that went wide of the mark.

After all these things, we have arrived at the essential question whether the maintenance of a condition of cultural second class status — against which the national minority defends itself by using to the utmost degree the opportunities in fostering literature and the national traditions to reach the highest level of achievement (a Hungarian choir from Slovakia had international success in Europe) — is useful for the necessary social integration. Socialist patriotism cannot be full and frank if the sense of inequality becomes a mass emotion, which will have a harmful effect even if in the economic area the equality of the citizens creates attainable well-being for all. We must state that the integrating effect of the general economic rise is spoiled by the latent antagonism growing from cultural inequality.

A second class status rises when national minority questions are in a fluid state for decades, a socialist literature on the problem exists only in abstract forms, but nowhere is there an answer to the question about what kind of rights does a minority have on the basis of its numbers, compact settlement, historical consciousness and traditions. Nor is there an answer to the question when and on basis of what endowments an ethnic population may become a subjective body, or even a legal body. When can it have national organs by means of which it can participate in the development of its destiny? There is no literature in Hungary either for the study of minority conditions of life, although a study of the present nationality problem would be amply justified in respect to the millions of Hungarians living in neighboring states.

The handling of minority ethnic populations as negligible fragments is not an answer to the serious problems in which the individuals belonging to the minority are recognized as equal and the justification for which is that as separate individuals they can participate in legislation and governing organs; but such a presence is always only symbolic because these are not organs of the nationality collective.

This practice has become essentially a rigid one during the past quarter century in the Danube area, although it is becoming more and more obvious that it does not satisfy the modern needs of the national minorities, creates antagonisms, and raises lack of confidence.

We cannot justify and explain the procrastination in a modern handling of the problem with theories that the existence of the national minorities is a short-term problem because urbanization, industrialization, and the scientific and technical revolution will liquidate the national minorities within a short time by assimilation. As we have shown from the history of the past 50 years, even if this were true we cannot even speak of the possibility for the disappearance of national minorities in terms of decades — particularly not in the Danube area — because the scientific-technical revolution has its own linguistic and cultural effects at preservation (radio, television, tourism), and therefore those notions are illusory according to which a self-conscious national fragment which has existed for many centuries can be made to disappear in a matter of decades.

In the case of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, we cannot speak of a dying nation. The assimilative influences which are undoubtedly being felt have achieved altogether so much that in an overall-state relationship the relative number of Hungarians has declined, but on the other hand their absolute number has increased. (The cause of the relative decline is not only assimilation but also the greater natural increase at present of the Slovak majority.) We rightfully declare that we count on the future growth of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, and we assume that after the principles laid down in the constitutional law are realized and implemented that this optimism will receive a realistic basis, which would be the first step toward full and actual equality.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Demograficka prirucka," Prague, 1966, p. 46.
2. Jan Sindelka, "Narodnostni otazka a socializmus," Prague, 1966.
3. Ibid., p. 287.
4. Samuel Cambel, "Slovenska agrarna otazka," 1944-1948, Bratislava, 1972.
5. Juraj Zvara, "A magyar nemzetisegi kerdes megoldasa Szlovakiaban," Bratislava, 1965.
6. Faltus-Prucha, "Prehľad hospodarskeho vyvoja na Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1945," Bratislava, 1967, p. 138.
7. Zdenka Holotikova, "Niektore problémy slovenskej politiky v rokoch 1921-1925," Bratislava, HISTORICKÝ CASOPIS, No 3, 1966.

8. "Demografia," Prague, 1971, No 4.
9. Laszlo Deme, "Nyelvi es nyelvhasznalati gondjainkrol," Bratislava, 1970
pp. 272-273.
10. Laszlo Kovago, "Nemzetisegi kerdes—Nemzetisegi politika," Budapest, 1968,
pp. 48 and 49.
11. At present there are 18 nation-wide Hungarian newspapers and periodicals
in the CSSR.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DETAILS OF L-39 TRAINER PROVIDED

East Berlin FLIEGER REVUE in German No 2, Feb 77 pp 64-71

[Text] In February we celebrate the week of brotherhood in arms with the forces of the Warsaw Pact nations. This is an event which on one hand symbolizes the unity of the socialist military coalition, and on the other, reflects the multiplicity of mutual relationships and collaboration which encompasses almost all areas of life, thus also the area of socialist economic integration. One prominent example of many is the modern standard TL [turbojet engine] Trainer, Aero L-39 "Albatros," concerning which the Czech foreign trade enterprise OMNIPOL has been friendly enough to provide us with comprehensive material.

When the changeover from reciprocating engine to TL machines began in the military air fleet after World War II, two-seater trainer versions of the actual fighter planes were used at first. The costs of training in these uneconomically designed aircraft were extraordinarily high. Thereafter, they rose ever further with the increasingly more efficient, complicated and thus also more expensive TL fighter aircraft.

No wonder, therefore, that experts all over the world racked their brains as to how this distressing state of affairs could be overcome. Some of them had even worked out certain rules of thumb concerning how much these costs increased. They said: One flight hour costs about a thousandth of the contract price of the aircraft. Compared with an aircraft in a speed class of up to 300 km/h, the costs per training hour for a machine achieving up to 850 km/h increase ten times. For aircraft which fly near the speed of sound, the latter sum doubles again. This amount finally doubles again for aircraft which fly over the speed of sound.

Out of these considerations, there arose in the 1950's the first generation TL trainers, aircraft which were substantially cheaper to acquire and operate than the actual fighter aircraft. They were designed on one hand to prepare flight trainees sufficiently to fly the TL fighter aircraft, and on the other hand, to keep costs within reasonable limits.

In capitalist countries, this savings in training with the new TL trainer was in large part eaten up again by the development of a multiplicity of

such types. All too many aircraft construction concerns and companies wanted to profit there from the new TL trainer market. As a result, 11 different TL trainers are in use in 13 NATO nations and France, and even within the individual countries, e.g. the US, there are several models (T-33, T-37, T-2) alongside each other. It is obvious that the developmental and operational outlays for so many models must come to a far higher total than for a few or only one standard trainer, not even including the developmental costs for the numerous competing models where were not mass produced.

Such conditions are inevitable in countries with capitalistic economic systems, since it is well known that the equipment of the armed forces is substantially determined by the profit interests of the defense industry.

With us, the situation is quite different. Thus, Leonid Brezhnev said at the congress of the CPSU Central Committee on October 25th, 1976: "To insure a high level of the armed forces of our country in the future as well, and to take care that the Soviet soldiers always have the most modern weapons, which the imperialists cannot ignore -- that is our sacred duty before the people and we will do it! At the same time, we have no greater desire than to employ the means, which at present are necessarily withdrawn from the national economy, to raise the standard of living of the workers and to achieve the goals of construction."

Since all countries in the socialist camp espouse this viewpoint, it is in the interest of all our national economies to employ defense expenditures as efficiently as possible.

And precisely this has been achieved by the community project of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the second generation L-29 TL trainer, which was developed by the aeronautical industry of the CSSR with Soviet aid. But the efficient utilization of defense expenditures is demonstrated not solely in the production of a standard jet trainer for the CEMA countries. Economy runs like a red thread through the entire concept of the L-39 project. Economy was a factor in not only the development of this model, but also in its operation. To make the training as inexpensive as possible, not just the TL trainer itself, but an entire "System 39" was produced. Thus, the workers and engineers of the Rudy Letov Works in Letnany produced the TL-39 simulator. We have already presented this unit in the 1/75 issue on pages 26 - 27. For this reason, we will only repeat a short summary: with the TL-39, risk-free basic training, retraining and keeping in practice are possible; even sorties can be simulated. Above all, however, it must be emphasized that 1 simulator hour with the TL-39 costs only 10 percent of a flight hour. Naturally, accidents can also be simulated with this unit, so the pilot can be prepared without risk for all eventualities, and taught how to behave in emergency situations. Exiting the aircraft by means of the ejection seat is the only thing that cannot be simulated with the TL-39. But even for that purpose a cost saving and risk-free training opportunity was created within this training system: the NKTL 29-39 ejection seat simulator.

No. 4 in the training complex is the KL-39 automated mobile checkout unit. With its help, the technical status of the systems, assemblies and on-board instruments -- a total of 237 parameters, including those that can otherwise be tested only under laboratory conditions -- can be checked during preflight preparation in a very short time. This unit too contributes substantially to making the training as inexpensive as possible.

But first let us proceed to the main component of Training System 39, the TL trainer:

Aero L-39 "Albatros"

The development of this second generation TL trainer simultaneously reflects the socialist economic integration of the CEMA countries. Whereas to equip the Warsaw Pact nations with a first generation TL trainer, three different models (the Soviet Yak-30, the Polish TS-11, and the Czech L-29) were developed, and the last mentioned selected as the standard trainer, only the CSSR received the contract for the development of a successor model.

This cost, time and labor saving procedure had become possible through advances in the division of labor, which, in the aviation industry of the community of socialist countries, assigned to the CSSR the task of developing and constructing training planes and related equipment. Thus, the prototype of the new TL trainer was developed in the Vodochody aircraft plant, based on the experience with the L-29 "Delfin" and in collaboration with Soviet experts, and naturally also in constant consultation with representatives of the air force. On November 4th, 1968, prototype 02 took off on its maiden flight (01 was used in strength trials). By the end of 1970, five further models were completed for flight tests and two for ground tests. While research and testing center 031 took over the technical testing, the military ones were conducted by the "Slovakian Rebellion" advanced military flight institute at Kosice. The first models of the L-39 were initially equipped with the AI-25W Soviet engine, a version of the very economical engine built into the Soviet Yakovlev Yak-40 ultra-shortrange aircraft. After work could be successfully completed on a later variant, the higher performance AI-25TL, this new engine was installed in the L-39 and tested. As with any other aircraft, a few necessary changes resulted during testing, which could be seen purely externally in the series produced models as contrasted with the prototype, e.g., in the omission of the small boundary layer guard between the landing flap and aileron, and in the enlargement and strengthening of the two side air intakes in order to increase the air flow. The testing showed -- and this is particularly important for a trainer -- that the L-39 is a very safe aircraft. Thus, it does not react negatively even to gross errors by the flight student in landing: it does not pancake, and has no tendency to spin; when it nevertheless does spin, it stops again by itself.

On October 23rd, 1974, the development of the new aircraft was brought to a close: at its concluding session in Prague, the responsible state commission approved the L-39 for mass production in the Vodochody Aircraft Plant.

The L-39 is of an all-metal construction. The individual subassemblies may be seen in the drawing on page 67. The fuselage, a semimonocoque structure, consists of two main parts. The forward part of the fuselage is subdivided into three sections. Almost all the radio and electronic equipment is housed in the nose, and is made conveniently accessible for servicing by large, upward opening flaps. The nose also accommodates the nose landing gear when retracted. It is a non-braking, pivoting fork landing gear with a hydraulic oil shock absorbing strut, has tubeless, low pressure tires, size 430 x 150 and is retracted to the front. The second section forms the two-place pressurized cockpit. It is completely air conditioned, and the automatic temperature control takes in a range of from +10° Celsius to +28° Celsius for ambient temperatures of from -55° to +45° Celsius. The forward windshield, which in the case of the L-29 was still rigidly secured to the fuselage, can be swung out to the front and thus makes easy access possible to the forward cockpit fittings and instruments. Furthermore, it has a de-icing system. The two sharply arched cockpit canopies, which can be swung open to the right, provide for excellent visibility. By means of access steps on the port side, which can be swung out, the crew can get into the cockpit without having to use ladders placed on the outside. Two VSI-BRI rocket powered ejection seats permit abandoning the aircraft in emergency situations in a velocity range of from 150 to 910 km/h, even at 0 m altitude. A flight data recorder is part of the permanent equipment.


Housed in the third section are the five rubber fuel tanks, which hold 824 kg in all. They have only one filler neck, something which speeds the refueling up considerably. The full length through wing surface is secured at the lower part of this section. Lying above this, and protected by the wings against stones, etc., which are thrown up, are the air intakes on both sides of the fuselage. They are provided with boundary layer separators and can be heated at the leading edges in order to prevent ice build-up. This section is closed off to the rear by the firewall.

The rear part of the fuselage accommodates the engine. It is easy to separate from the forward section -- in this case, only a few cables and linkages need to be removed -- and thus easy access to the engine, as well as its rapid replacement are possible. This section forms a subassembly together with the rudder and elevator fins, and the latter are adjustable.

As already indicated, the L-39 has a continuous wing, fabricated in one piece, something which is an advantageous solution from a production engineering viewpoint. It is fabricated using two spars and monocoque construction, thus a structural approach which contributes substantially to the strength and stiffness of the structure when covered with the wing skin.

The differential ailerons, which are equipped with trim tabs, are aerodynamically balanced, and the landing flaps are designed as dfal gap flaps. Located in the fuselage area below the continuous wing are two braking flaps, which deploy automatically upon reaching the critical Mach number, for example, in a dive. The wing also houses the main landing gear in the retracted position, in which case the wheel well cover is closed immediately after the landing

gear is extended in order to avoid fouling the landing gear well when landing. The fastening and pivot pin of the hydraulic oil shock absorbing strut is hinged between the two spars. The wheels are seated in pivot arms. The hydraulic disc brakes work in such a manner that no jamming can occur. When the landing gear is retracted, the wheels are automatically braked. The tubeless low pressure tires are size 610 x 185. This landing gear design permits the utilization of the L-39 on surfaces which have a load capacity of only 5 kg/cm², thus from unpaved fields. The extension and retraction of the landing gear is accomplished hydraulically, however, in an emergency it can be brought into the landing position using impact air pressure.



Above: View into the forward cockpit of the L-39.

Located at each wing tip is a permanently attached fuel tank of 150 liter capacity. The plastic sheathing of the tanks additionally accommodates the landing headlights and the radio antennas.

TL-Trainer Aero L-39 „Albatros“

- 24 - Leiteinlaß für das Triebwerk
- 25 - Luftzuführungskanal
- 26 - Kraftstoff-Einfüllstutzen
- 27 - Gummisack-Kraftstoff
- 28 - Niederdruckverdichter
- 29 - verstellbare Höhenflügel
- 30 - Höhenruder
- 31 - Heckpositionsleuchte
- 32 - Seitenruder
- 33 - Trimmruder des Seitenruders

- 1 - Druck-Anzeigegerät
- 2 - Klappen des Buggeräteraumes
- 3 - Bugrad-Fahrwerkschacht
- 4 - Buggeräteraum für Funk- und Elektronikausrüstung
- 5 - Anzeigestift der Bugrad-Fahrwerksstellung
- 6 - Instrumentenbrettverkleidung
- 7 - Zielgerät ASP-3-NMU-39
- 8 - Steuersäule
- 9 - Steuerbord-Gerätebedienungskonsole
- 10 - Anschnallgurt
- 11 - Schleudersitz
- 12 - Steuergestänge des Höhenruders
- 13 - Steuergestänge des Seitenruders
- 14 - Konsole für Außenlasten
- 15 - Staurohr
- 16 - Landescheinwerfer
- 17 - Blendschutzanstrich
- 18 - Betankungsklappe der Flügelendbehälter
- 19 - Kraftstoff-Notablaß
- 20 - Querruder
- 21 - Trimmruder
- 22 - Verkleidung der Landeklappenführung
- 23 - Landeklappen

- 53 - Fahrwerkschacht
- 54 - Grenzschnittschneide
- 55 - Bremsklappe
- 56 - Abdeckklappe des Einstieg-Trittlöches
- 57 - Einstiegsmarkierung
- 58 - eingeklappte Einstieg-Trittsstufe
- 59 - Steuergestänge für Quer-, Höhen- u. Seitenruder
- 60 - Seitenruderpedal
- 61 - ausgeklappte Einstieg-Trittsstufe
- 62 - Triebwerksdrosselhebel

- 63 - Backbord-Gerätebedienungskonsole
- 64 - Spürzwang
- 65 - Fahrwerkbein
- 66 - schlauchloser Niederdruckreifen
- 67 - Gabelschwingen
- 68 - Stoßdämpfer
- 69 - Antenne
- 70 - Anschluß für die automatische I KL-39
- 71 - GFK-Rumpfspitze

- 24 - Lufteinlaß für das Triebwerk
- 25 - Luftzuführungs kanal zum Triebwerk
- 26 - Kraftstoff-Einfüllstutzen
- 27 - Gummisack-Kraftstoffbehälter
- 28 - Niederdruckverdichter
- 29 - verstellbare Höhenflosse
- 30 - Höhenruder
- 31 - Heckpositionsleuchte
- 32 - Seitenruder
- 33 - Trimmruder des Seitenruders

- 34 - Trimmruder des Höhenruders
- 35 - Schubstrahlaustrittsöffnung
- 36 - Elektromotor zum Antrieb des Trimmruders
- 37 - Antenne des Funkhöhenmessers
- 38 - Schubrohr
- 39 - Zweistromtriebwerk AI-25
- 40 - Luftauslaß der Hilfsturbine
- 41 - Verstellgestänge der Landeklappen
- 42 - Fahrwerk-Einziehzylinder
- 43 - Elektromotor zum Antrieb des Querruder-Trimmruders
- 44 - Verstellgestänge des Trimmruders
- 45 - Steuergestänge des Querruders
- 46 - Backbord-Positionsleuchte
- 47 - Flächentank-Kraftstoffleitung
- 48 - Verbindungsleitung zum Staurohr
- 49 - Fahrwerk-Bremsschlauch
- 50 - schlauchloser Niederdruckreifen
- 51 - Verkleidungsblech
- 52 - Lagerung des Hauptfahrwerkes

53 - Gerätebedienungskonsole
 54 - Rang
 55 - Cockpit
 56 - schlauchloser Niederdruckreifen
 57 - Schwingen
 58 - Empfänger
 59 - für die automatische Prüfeinrichtung
 60 - Lampenspitze

- Zeichnung: Reich

The Aero L-39 "Albatros" TL Trainer [Key]:

1. Pressure gauge; 2. Cover flaps for the nose equipment compartment; 3. Nose wheel landing gear well; 4. Nose equipment compartment for radio and electronics gear; 5. Indicator pin for the nose wheel landing gear position; 6. Instrument panel cover; 7. ASP-3-NMU-30 sight; 8. Control stick; 9. Starboard equipment operating console; 10. Safety belt; 11. Ejection seat; 12. Control linkage for the stabilizer; 13. Control linkage for the rudder; 14. Bracket for external loads; 15. Pitot tube; 16. Landing headlight; 17. Antiglare paint; 18. Refueling cover of the wingtip tanks; 19. Emergency fuel drain; 20. Ailerons; 21. Trim flaps; 22. Fairing for the landing flap guide; 23. Landing flap; 24. Air intake for the engine; 25. Air feed channel to the engine; 26. Fuel filler neck; 27. Rubber bag fuel tanks; 28. Low pressure compressor; 29. Adjustable horizontal stabilizer; 30. Elevator; 31. Tail navigation light; 32. Side rudder; 33. Side rudder trim tab; 34. Elevator trim tab; 35. Jet thrust outlet; 36. Electric motor for trim tab drive; 37. Radio altimeter antenna; 38. Jet pipe; 39. AI-25 ducted fan power plant; 40. Air exhaust of the auxiliary turbine; 41. Control linkage for the landing flaps; 42. Landing gear retraction cylinder; 43. Electric motor for the aileron trim tab drive; 44. Trim tab adjusting linkage; 45. Aileron control linkage; 46. Port side navigation light; 47. Flat tank fuel line; 48. Connecting line to the Pitot tube; 49. Landing gear brake line; 50. Tubeless low pressure tires; 51. Fairing; 52. Main landing gear mounting; 53. Landing gear well; 54. Boundary layer edge; 55. Air brake; 56. Cover plate for the access ladder opening; 57. Access marking; 58. Retracted access ladder; 59. Control linkage for the ailerons, elevators and rudder; 60. Rudder pedal; 61. Access ladder swung out; 62. Power plant throttle lever; 63. Port side equipment operating console; 64. Pivot bearing; 65. Landing gear strut; 66. Tubeless low pressure tires; 67. Pivoting fork; 68. Shock absorber; 69. Antenna; 70. Connection for the KL-39 automated checkout unit; 71. Fiberglass nose of the fuselage.

The coupling of the control forces to the ailerons, rudder and elevator, as well as the control of the engine, is accomplished via linkages, and the drive for the trim tabs, through electric motors. Landing and brake flaps are hydraulically actuated. The fuel is delivered to the engine from the main flat end tanks by means of circulating pumps.

As already noted, the L-39 is outfitted with extensive radio and electronic equipment. This includes the UKW/RTL-11 [UHF/RT] communications radio unit. It serves for both communications with ground stations and other aircraft. The low frequency band of the set is used as an on-board intercom between the two crew members. In case of failure of the UKW/RTL-11, an on-board intercom operating independently of it comes into service.

The RKL41 radio compass serves for the solution of primary radionavigation problems using an omnidirectional transmitter in the long and medium wave bands. It provides for automatic or aural direction finding in the 150 - 1,800 KHz frequency range.

The RV-5 radio altimeter continually displays the true altitude above the ground, and warns the pilot in case he goes below the preset critical altitude. The MRP-56P/S marker beacon receiver automatically signals acoustically and visually when flying over the ground station.

The identification and DF unit automatically responds to a selected code signal, transmitted by other aircraft or ground stations. The L-39 can carry bombs, air-to-ground or air-to-air missiles on two hanger racks located under the wings for combat training. Furthermore, a FKP-2-2 gunsight camera is built in for firing training. An ASP-3-NMU-39 gyroscopic reflex sight is used for aiming. The actuation of the sighting mechanisms, as well as the firing and launch armament, is accomplished electrically.

As already mentioned, the L-39 has a very economically operating power plant in the AI-25 TL dual cycle jet engine. In order to make the aircraft largely independent of ground facilities, the engine can be started by means of a built-in SV-35 auxiliary turbine. The entire starting process is controlled electronically. An automatically operating fire extinguishing system is installed to combat possible fires in the engine compartment. Fitted at all the requisite points are adequately dimensioned service covers for easy servicing of the entire machine. A substantially simplified time and money saving inspection of the machine was achieved though by the development of the automated monitoring system.

KL-39

The heart of this system is the central measurement station housed in a variant of a UAZ-452 delivery truck. It is coupled to the corresponding connection points on the L-39, which are concentrated and easily accessible, through electrical and pneumatic cable lines, which are brought out partially through an extension arm. Additionally, a remote control system, a throttle lever control servomechanism and an instrument panel vibrator are connected in the cockpit of the L-39. All of the values of the parameters to be checked are measured, recorded and processed in accordance with a preset, perforated tape program from the central measurement station housed in the motor vehicle. The following is a breakdown of the parameters to be checked:

Hydraulic system	12
Hermetic seals	3
Fuel system	6
Air conditioning system	7
Armaments	37
Radio system	83
Electrical system	42
Flight instrumentation	19
Power plant	16
Turbine starter	12
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Also included among the equipment of the central measurement station in the truck are a photoelectric reader for the perforated tape program, as well as

a high speed printer for recording the measurement data, and additionally, a radio set for communications with the airport control tower.

For the usual checkout of about 120 parameters within the scope of a preflight check, the KL-30 systems needs only 30 minutes.

Data and Flight Performance of the L-39

Wing:

Wingspan	9.46 m
Wing area	18.8 m ²
Wing profile	NACA 64 A 012 Mod. 5
Aspect ratio	4.4
Taper	0.475
Sweepback	1° 45'
Dihedral	2° 30'
Wing installation angle	2°
Geometrical offset	0°
Average aerodynamic chord	2.15 m

Landing Flaps:

Span width ratio	47%
Chord ratio	29%
Total surface area	2 x 1.34 m ²
Extension at take-off	25°
Extension when landing	44°

Ailerons:

Span width ratio	32%
Chord ratio	26%
Total surface area (behind axis of rotation)	2 x 0.62 m ²
Total surface area (in front of axis of rotation)	2 x 0.23 m ²
Maximum extension	± 16°

Fuselage:

Length	11.9 m
Length with rudder	12.32 m
Overall height with rudder	4.72 m
Surface area subject to flow	41.5 m ²

Air Brakes:

Surface area (including slot in fuselage)	2 x 0.25 m ²
Maximum extension	55°

Horizontal Stabilizer:

Span width	4.40 m
Total surface area (throughout)	5.07 m ²

Elevator span width	2 x 176 m
Chord ratio (from the axis of rotation)	29%
Total surface area (behind the axis of rotation)	1.14 m ²

Rudder Assembly:

Height (above the axis of the fuselage)	2.8 m
Total surface area	3.48 m ²
Side rudder span width	1.70 m
Chord ratio (from the axis of rotation)	27%
Total area (behind the axis of rotation)	0.71 m ²

Landing Gear:

Track width	2.44 m
Wheel base	4.39 m

Weights:

Empty weight	3,200 kg
Take-off weight, normal	4,120 kg
Take-off weight, maximum	4,535 kg
Surface loading	220 - 240 kg/m ²

Flight Performance:

All flight performance data are referenced to the ISA atmosphere, a design flight weight of 4,100 kg, and a maximum static engine thrust (on the test stand) of 1,720 kp minus 2%.

Maximum Speed:

At 0 m altitude	700 km/h
At 5,000 m altitude	750 km/h
Maximum permissible speed	0.8 Mach

Rate of Climb: 22.0 m/sec

Climb time to 5,000 m altitude	5.0 min
Climb time to 8,000 m altitude	10.0 min

Service Ceiling: 11,300 m

Take-off run for a flap extension of 25°; liftoff speed 185 km/h;
Zero altitude;

On a concrete runway	450 m
On grass	560 m

Landing run with a flap extension of 44°, zero altitude; touchdown speed 170 km/h:

On a concrete runway	620 m
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Range at 5,000 m altitude:

With 824 kg of fuel	910 km
With 980 kg of fuel	1,090 km.

The NKTL 29-39

This is the designation of the ejection seat ground simulator.

As the name already implies, it was developed for pilot training in the L-29, but was made a component of the Training System 39 through the appropriate additions with the simulation of L-39 cockpit and a L-39 ejection seat. The design of the unit can be seen from the photograph. The NKTL 29-39 should make it possible for the pilots to train for ejecting from the aircraft without risk so that in a possible emergency, he has a completely sure mastery of all the requisite handholds and steps to be taken. Also included here is the procedure in case the cockpit breakaway fails or the ejection seat drive breaks down; both events can likewise be simulated with the NKTL 29-39. The preparation for an ejection escape using this unit amounts to a maximum of four minutes.

The brothers in arms of the air forces of the Warsaw Pact nations have been provided with a modern training system which is cost saving and meets all requirements.

The L-39 TL trainer, in terms of an international comparison, is approximately on a par with the Dassault/Breguet-Dornier "Alpha-Jet" and the British Hawker Siddeley "Hawk", which have actually only just outgrown the prototype stage. Along with the other TL, KL and NKTL-39 training equipment, Training System 39 sets the world standard.

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EAST GERMANY

CONVENTION OF CRIMES AGAINST PROTECTED PERSONS, DIPLOMATS RATIFIED

[Editorial Report] East Berlin GESETZBLATT (LEGAL GAZETTE) in German Part II No. 5 of 25 March 1977 publishes on page 61 the announcement of the ratification of the "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents" dated 16 February 1977 and signed by H. Eichler, secretary of the GDR State Council. On pages 62-73 GESETZBLATT carries the text of the Convention in German, Russian and English as well as a reprint of UN General Assembly Resolution 3166 of 14 December 1973 which deals with the above-mentioned convention.

The "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents" was published by the United Nations in New York on 14 December 1973. It contains 20 articles and sets forth the responsibilities ratifying states undertake to fulfill with regard to punishing those responsible for committing crimes against protected persons and diplomats and with regard to conditions governing extradition of such offenders where applicable.

The announcement of ratification on page 61 states that the GDR State Council ratified the convention on 15 November 1976, having already signed it on 23 May 1974. The LEGAL GAZETTE further states that the date on which the convention goes into effect for the GDR will be announced in a subsequent issue.

The ratification announcement also carries the following qualification: "The German Democratic Republic does not consider itself bound by the regulations in Article 13, Paragraph 1. The German Democratic Republic endorses the viewpoint that in consonance with the principle of sovereign equality of states the agreement of all parties to a dispute is necessary in order to submit a particular dispute to arbitration or to submit it to the International Court of Justice."

Article 13, Paragraph 1 of the convention reads as follows: "Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within 6 months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justices by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court."

EAST GERMANY

GDR DEFENSE COSTS ANALYZED

Cologne DEUTSCHLAND-ARCHIV in German No 2, Feb 77 signed to press 25 Jan 77
pp 160-168

[Article by Karl Wilhelm Fricke: "The GDR Defense Budget"--revised and updated version of author's report to the Second Symposium of the "Research Agency for All-German Economic Social Questions" on 18-19 November 1976 in Berlin]

[Text] Did the GDR reduce its military budget? At first sight, it would seem so. The Law on the 1977 Government Budget, which was adopted by the People's Chamber of 15 December 1976 in Article 6 "establishes the national defense expenditures of the German Democratic Republic at M7,868.0 million" (1). But we learn what the real volume is only if we look at article 7: "The expenditures for the public security, administration of justice, and security of the international boundaries of the German Democratic Republic amount to M3,155.0 million." In other words, the expenditures for the external and internal security of the GDR in 1977 total M11,023.0 million, an increase of 7.7 percent over last year. The only new thing here is the way the budget titles were split up after they had earlier for many years been shown as a single item for "national defense and security."

Astonishingly enough, the GDR defense budget so far has hardly ever been the subject of more detailed investigations. Not even an overview of the official target figures and the actual figures has been available so far. Although the budget revealed here permits realistic statements only to a limited degree, its critical analysis is nevertheless justified. Before we go into a review of the development of GDR defense budgets since 1976, we might make a few remarks on the concept itself.

Basically, the GDR defense budget is not defined in any way different from the way it is defined in West Germany. An East Berlin military dictionary, which can certainly be credited with being official, explains it as "a part of the money concentrated in the agencies of the socialist government and used for the buildup or expansion of socialist national defense. It is a component of the government budget and accordingly a part of the unified socialist financial system." And it goes on to say: "The funds flowing into the defense budget are determined by government plans and laws. Their

amount depends on the country's economic strength and on national defense requirements which are conditioned by the political and military situation. The volume of expenditures is established in the particular budget plans for the current year. By virtue of a resolution of the GDR people's chamber, the entire government budget plan and its components then assume the force of law" (2). The quotation, which at any rate is taken from a technical dictionary, documents how meaningless GDR statements on the defense budget can be. "Meyers Neues Lexikon" from Leipzig offers the following explanation under the key word "defense budget": "Portion of government budget of socialist country from which national defense expenditures are taken care of. The amount of the defense budget is determined on the basis of the particular country's economic growth through objective requirements arising from the imperialist threat and the development tendency in military affairs" (3). The reference to the development tendencies in military affairs of course is quite general but nevertheless quite noteworthy too.

A military-economy standard work goes into somewhat more detail on this concept at least: "To secure the fighting strength, combat readiness, and mobilization readiness, as ordered, the military establishment and all sectors of national defense are also given corresponding funds. The enemy's military policy forces us to constitute a very considerable level of funds for purposes of national defense."

"They exist on the central level primarily as the defense budget. It encompasses the budgets of the various sectors. The funds allocated to the NVA [National People's Army] for the accomplishment of its political, military, and material supply functions represent the NVA budget. Money for military purposes however also exists in the form of budget funds which are supplied from the central funds of subordinate echelons. However, they remain a part of the uniform budget, for example, in the NVA. Looking at it from the military-economic viewpoint, we refer to this money as the financial defense fund of socialist society. In practice it exists only as an annual amount of money to be allocated. The financial defense fund also contains money for nonmaterial services, as well as the service pay, wages, salaries, and social welfare benefits to be dispersed to the civilian employees and members of the military establishment." Its most important source "is the socialist government budget in the narrower sense of the word. Through it, via the final redistribution of the national income, a portion of money of socialist society is formed as the defense budget, as determined by military and political necessities as well as economic possibilities, and that money is channeled to the military consumption sphere. To a lesser extent however credits, insurance amounts, and similar items are also sources of the financial defense fund" (4). Nothing more or nothing specific is said after that. The author has been unable to find explanations on the structure of the military budget or a specific breakdown of the defense budget in GDR military publicity and literature. Not even statistics on military expenditures could be found. Such statistics of course can be compiled with the help of individual data from various GDR sources. In analyzing them we must keep in mind what sectors national defense encompasses in the GDR to begin with.

Undoubtedly, we must include in the defense budget as such--in the expenditures for the NVA--the expenditures for "internal security" especially since the latter to a considerable extent make up the costs for the so-called border security system and the maintenance of the border guard forces.

The "System of National Defense"

This view corresponds not only to practical experience but also to the theoretical approach of GDR military leaders. Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann, for example, made the following statement in 1968 in a speech to high-ranking military leaders in Dresden: "In terms of structure, our national defense system consists of several main sectors:

"1. The mobile military forces,

"consisting of

"(a) the major and minor units of the NVA organized in the combined forces;

"(b) the border guard units;

"2. The territorially assigned forces of national defense,

"consisting of

"(a) the territorial headquarters, units, and installations of the NVA;

"(b) the agencies of state security and the German People's Police, to the extent that they perform national defense functions;

"(c) the combat teams of the working class;

"(d) the headquarters, formations, reconnaissance forces, and special facilities of civil defense;

"3. The government and national economic agencies and installations to the extent that they must carry out functions designed to provide backup support for the armed forces and for the operational preparation of the territory;

"4. The scientific and educational installations of the armed forces;

"5. The government and social organizations and installations for the socialist defense education of the population, for premilitary training of youth, and for the military training of reservists" (5).

The important thing in this definition is represented by the fact that the border guard forces were included among "military forces."

The attempt to include specific statistics on the personnel strength of the GDR Armed Forces in this overview is rendered more difficult as a result of

official abstinence, as in the case of the defense budget. To the extent that this is recognizable, the GDR so far officially has published only two figures on the strength of the NVA. One of them is contained in Order No 1/1956 by the then National Defense Minister Willi Stoph, dated 10 February 1956, on the formation of the National People's Army, the Ministry of National Defense, and the introduction of uniforms for the NVA, according to which the NVA would be organized in ground forces, air forces, and naval forces, as well as air defense units with "a total strength of about 120,000 men" (6)--120,000, that is, excluding border guard forces who at that time were still called "German Border Police" and who were not contained in that figure.

The second figure can be taken from the 28 June 1956 GDR Council of Ministers resolution according to which "the anticipated total strength of the NVA is to be reduced from 120,000 to 90,000 men" (7). This figure was once again confirmed in East Berlin in 1964. "The introduction of the draft changes nothing in the NVA manpower ceiling of 90,000 men" (8). Subsequent GDR sources reveal neither one, nor the other figure--as a matter of fact, no statistics are given any longer.

Judging by the expansion of the GDR defense budget, Western estimates (9) would seem to be rather realistic; according to those estimates, the GDR ground forces today number 98,000 men, while the air forces and the air defense forces total 28,000 and the naval forces 17,000 men. That would add up to a total of 143,000 men. In addition we have the GDR border guard forces estimated at 46,000 men, plus the garrisoned units of the Ministry of State Security, the alert police and the transportation police, totalling about 29,000 men. Finally, according to Hoffmann's statements, we have about 400,000 men in the "combat teams of the working class" [factory militia] plus several thousand men in the garrisoned units of civil defense who must be added to the "national defense system."

It remains to be determined whether the GDR defense budget shown actually also includes all costs which were to be paid and are to be paid to finance this comprehensive "national defense system." Apart from the rather unlikely possibility of deliberate disinformation, the concealment of costs for certain construction projects or research projects, serving military purposes, might be conceivable through placement among "innocuous" budget items--although this cannot be proved.

GDR Defense Budget Growth

The statistical table given later on regarding the growth of the GDR defense budget requires some explanatory comments. It begins with the year 1956 which, formally was the year the NVA was founded (10). There is no need for any detailed discussion of the fact here that military forces had been built up in the GDR already considerably before that date, that the first cadres were organized even before the founding of the GDR. On the other hand, a specific figure on the GDR defense budget was published for the first time in 1956. It comes from the then Finance Minister Willi Rumpf

who made the following statement in his budget address to the People's Chamber on 8 February 1956:

"On the basis of the People's Chamber's resolution on the creation of the national people's army, an amount of DM974.8 million was for the first time allocated in this year's budget to the Ministry of National Defense for expenditures connected with the organization and maintenance of the National People's Army. The funds so far allocated in the old budget for the KVP [Garrisoned People's Police] have been deleted" (11).

This quotation is interesting last but not least because Rumpf makes it clear here that the defense budget at that time was to cover exclusively the costs arising for the organization and maintenance of the NVA, in other words, not the expenditures for the other main sectors which, according to Hoffmann, belonged to the defense system and which essentially existed already prior to 1956, apart from civil defense. But this means that considerable funds for national defense must have been contained in other budget items at that time, in addition to the defense budget. The financing of the "factory militia" for example would mainly seemed to have been a matter for the Ministry of the Interior under which they still are. The same applies to the alert police and the transportation police. The armed forces of the Ministry of State Security must logically have been financed from that ministry's budget.

The budget plan itself does not separately show a military budget for 1956. The figure for 1957 likewise cannot be detected in the budget; instead, it can be detected once again from the budget speech which Rumpf delivered to the People's Chamber (12). The figures for 1958-1960 likewise cannot be found in the published budget plans. In contrast to the 2 prior years, Rumpf in his budget speeches to the People's Chamber talked in terms of lump, partly inaccurate and partly percentage figures. On the other hand, the corresponding "Yearbooks of the German Democratic Republic" do contain exact figures (13). The figure for 1961 is particularly problematical. But in the budget plan law, it turns up as little as it did during the earlier years. In his People's Chamber budget speech on 24 March 1961, Rumpf was content with more than inadequate data: "Expenditures for the government machine and national defense remain constant," he observed. "Their share out of the government budget's total expenditures goes down, specifically, from 5.9 down to 5.5 percent for the government machine and from 2.2 down to 2 percent for national defense expenditures" (14). That would correspond to a sum of about a little more than M1 billion--and that is by no means a realistic figure. It is denied last but not least by the 1962 military budget. Finance Minister Rumpf gave the People's Chamber a figure of M2,764.0 million when, on 28 March 1962, he talked about the need of "making higher material and financial resources available this year for our republic's national defense" (15). After an "explanation of the budget computation" for the year 1963, which also contains data for the preceding year, a total of M2,820.7 million was made available in 1962 for "national defense" (16). A sudden jump in the 1962 military budget by approximately 180 percent over the preceding year cannot be justified even on the assumption that the GDR introduced the draft in

1962 (17) and that this might have led to higher costs because, 1961 at any rate was the year when the Berlin Wall was put up and when the border checkpoints around West Berlin and the western border of the GDR were improved and reinforced at a considerable financial expenditure for manpower and material.

It must be emphasized that the officially released statistics on the GDR defense budget in 1962 began to reveal a move toward realism. For 1963, the "national defense" expenditures were not to be changed compared to the current year, as Rumpf told the People's Chamber on 29 November 1962--of course without giving any specific figure.

They thus corresponded to a total of about M2,800.0 million. In point of fact, the expenditures, according to the budget computation, came to M2,802.3 million (18). Expenditures for the military establishment and armament in 1964-1967 once again were spelled out only in the subsequently published budget computations. Otherwise we can find precise data neither in the government budget plans for those years, nor in the budget addresses to the People's Chamber--in which connection it should be noted moreover that the 1964 government budget plan was not first discussed and adopted by the People's Chamber but merely in the Council of State at whose 3 October 1963 session Finance Minister Rumpf had to justify the draft. For the first time and so far, the only time in GDR history, the government budget plan was issued in the form of a Council of State edict--just like the 1964 national economic plan. Regarding 1965, Deputy Finance Minister Horst Kaminsky was vague enough in telling the People's Chamber that "national defense expenditures" will come to "MDN [Mark of the German Bank of Issue] 2.8 billion, as in 1964" (19). In the justifications for the 1966 and 1967 budget plan drafts, Rumpf or Kaminsky once again were content with lump-sum figures according to which, as in earlier years, "no more than 5 percent" would be spent on "securing defense preparedness" or "about 5 percent of the total government expenditures" would be planned on (20). The precise figures, as we said, can be found in the particular budget computations or in the explanations given for them (21).

The development of the GDR defense budget is easier to describe since 1968. Since that year, the government budget plans show data on military and armament expenditures separately and openly (22). A comparison with the particular budget computations (23) reveals hardly any noteworthy differences, as we can see from the table below for the 1956-1977 defense budget. We might mention that the government budget plans as of 1968 contain the corresponding formulation in a more general fashion than it had been employed earlier by the finance ministers or in the budget computations. Instead of the restriction to "national defense," the government budget plans in 1968-1976 more or less identically talk in terms of funds which must be allocated "for national defense and security." It therefore seems all the more interesting that the corresponding budget funds in the 1977 government budget plan for the first time appear as two different items--for "national defense" and for "public order, administration of justice, and security of the international boundary," which is tantamount to making a distinction

between "external security" and "internal security," on which the military character of the GDR border forces however quite naturally does not change anything. On the other hand, the defense and security costs, shown in government budget plans since 1968, roughly correspond to financial expenditures for the military and for armament--which at the same time means that the figures on the military budget, shown for the years before that, document nothing but the deliberate concealment of the actually higher expenditures.

On the basis of the sources indicated, the table below shows the estimated figures for 1956-1977 as well as the actual figures, to the extent that they could be taken from the budget computations cited. For comparison, we also computed the military budget growth rate (estimated and actual figures), related to the particular preceding year, as well as the military budget's percentage share out of the likewise listed total government budget expenditures (24).

Even if we confine ourselves to its own, official statistics, the GDR between 1956 and 1976 spent about M95 billion for the military establishment and for armament. To that we would have to estimate the costs for the armament of the SBZ [Soviet Occupation Zone]/GDR in 1948-1955 which are difficult to estimate.

1956-1977 GDR Government Budget Expenditures for Defense and Security

Jahr	2	in Millionen Mark	4	5	Zuwachs-in vH zum Vorjahr	Gesamtausgaben	Anteil des Militär-
1	3	Plan	ist	3	ist 4	des Staatshaushalts	etats in vH 7
1956		974,8	.	.	.	35855,9	.
1957		976,2	.	.	.	36376,0	.
1958		979,7	.	.	.	42193,1	.
1959		989,0	.	.	.	46530,2	.
1960		990,0	.	.	.	49457,7	.
1961	8 ca.	1015,0	.	.	.	50764,3	.
1962		2764,0	2820,7	.	.	55502,5	5,1
1963		2800,0	2802,3	1,3	-0,7	56085,0	5,0
1964		2757,0	2735,0	-1,6	-2,4	56317,4	4,9
1965		2770,0	2770,0	0,5	1,2	55759,1	5,0
1966		3200,0	3200,0	15,5	15,5	60831,4	5,3
1967		3400,0	3538,0	6,3	10,8	59026,1	6,0
1968		5787,0	5765,0	70,2	62,9	59505,3	9,7
1969		6350,0	6321,0	9,7	9,6	64984,6	9,7
1970		6747,0	6733,5	6,3	6,5	69954,4	9,6
1971		7198,0	7167,0	6,7	6,6	79125,1	9,0
1972		7625,0	7625,0	5,9	6,3	85747,6	8,9
1973		8328,0	8328,0	9,2	9,2	93276,7	8,9
1974		8938,0	8732,5	7,3	4,9	103291,9	8,5
1975		9564,0	9564,0	7,0	9,5	114160,2	8,4
1976		10233,0	.	7,0	.	115882,4 (Plan)	8,8
1977		11023,0	.	7,7	.	122181,0 (Plan)	9,0

Legend: 1--Year; 2--In millions of marks; 3--Estimated; 4--Actual; 5--Percentage increase over preceding year; 6--Total government budget expenditures; 7--Military budget percentage share; 8--Approximately.

Military Budget Structure

An attempt to say something about the structure of the defense budget and cost development in the military establishment is bound to be confined to pointing up general development tendencies because of a lack of reliable material. Here we must ask whether the expansion of the GDR military budget is the financial expression of an offensive military strategy or whether it can be explained in the light of the objective necessities of a modern army, arising from the "revolution in military technology and weapons."

Weapons technology and military equipment fundamentally today require ever larger shares of the military budget in absolute and relative terms. "Out of the total financial expenditures for the conduct of the war, weapons and equipment during the wars of the 19th century claimed 10-20 percent; during World War I the figure was 60 percent and during World War II it was already 70-75 percent" (25). At this time, the share is even higher. A modern army is constantly compelled to increase its military equipment inventory at a steady pace. To preserve its fighting efficiency and combat readiness, it must constantly increase its fire power, mobility, and striking power through more and better ordnance, tanks, and motor vehicles. "A Soviet motorized rifle division at the end of the sixties, compared to 1939, had 13 times more tanks, 37 times more transport vehicles, 13 times more automatic weapons, and 5 times more communications equipment" (26). The same equipment inventory would seem to apply to the motorized rifle divisions of the NVA. According to official party data (27), the degree of motorization of the NVA per man increased from 25 horsepower in 1958 to 35 horsepower in 1976.

East Berlin military economists leave no doubt as to the requirements thus facing the GDR national economy:

"Socialist military might can perform its assigned protective function only if its requirements for weapons and other military equipment and gear, supplies and provisions of the most varied kinds, as well as manifold material and nonmaterial services can be met uninterruptedly, on schedule, and with the required quality.

"National defense requirements thus confront the socialist economy with the task of always creating and providing all required material prerequisites to maintain the combat value and combat readiness of the armed forces.

"This means that capacities and resources must be diverted from the national economy; these capacities and resources are great in terms of scope, complicated in terms of structure, and very valuable in terms of quality. The socialist economy must under all conditions be capable of meeting military-economic requirements in an all-around fashion and this creates high and complicated requirements for its structure, mobility, organization, and management. The responsibility connected with this grows to the extent that the revolution in military affairs advances as a result of scientific-technological progress, to the extent that 'the industrialization' of warfare increases" (28).

Although the term "industrialization" has been placed in quotation marks in the excerpt quoted, its use in connection with the idea of warfare reveals unparalleled cynicism.

The development, it so happens, increases the requirement for supplies of all kinds. Experts estimate that, during a modern war, as a result of the larger number and higher rate of fire of modern weapons systems, the requirement for ammunition would be three times or four times the requirement during World War II. The complete motorization of the armies increased the requirement for POL even more: compared to World War II, any possible present-day combat operations would require five or six times as much fuel.

Triple or Quadruple Arms Conversion

The consequence of this development meant that the NVA would have to keep converting. In 1972 already Defense Minister Hoffmann told a military-policy forum in Espenhain that the NVA "in the case of certain weapons systems, such as tanks, aircraft, and AA missiles" had received "already the third or fourth generation because developments in the field of military technology took place so rapidly and because weapons types, which were still modern and very efficient during the fifties and sixties, today no longer meet combat requirements although they are not yet ready for the scrap heap in terms of the wear and tear of materiel" (29). This was confirmed once again at the Ninth SED Party Congress. The fact that certain weapons systems have already gone through three or four conversions was even specifically spelled out by the following information.

"All armed forces components have been equipped with the new proven types of Soviet weapons and equipment. Modern tanks of the famous T-series, amphibious APCs armed with cannon and guided AT missiles, automatic quadruple SP AA mounts, equipped with radar for action against low-flying aircraft, as well as improved launchers and tube artillery have been introduced into the motorized rifle and armored formations.

"The air forces have been equipped with modern AA rockets and interceptors which are armed with rockets and which are suitable for all-weather and nighttime employment.

"With the help of long-range radio-range stations, their radio detachments are in a position to pick up enemy missiles before they violate our air space.

"The People's Navy has efficient guided-missile PT-boats and new types of torpedo-firing PT-boats which are distinguished by great accuracy and destructive force" (30)

Even if we consider the agitational character of these statements, we cannot simply brush them aside as being irrelevant. They document the systematic conversions of the NVA which can be handled only with considerable financial expenditure. In analyzing the GDR defense budget and in studying its structure, we must at any rate consider that.

It has been pointed out earlier that there are no specific data available otherwise. In analogy to the West German defense budget, the structure however would not appear to be considerably different; if anything, the personnel costs of the NVA might possibly be somewhat lower than in West Germany because military pay and allowances in the GDR are lower than in West Germany. In 1976, 57.5 percent of the West German military budget consisted of expenditures for investments, equipment maintenance, and miscellaneous operating expenditures and 43.5 percent went for personnel expenditures (31). The NVA budget would seem to reveal roughly the same breakdown.

Unfortunately, we have no figures on weapons prices in the east. We only have a couple of statistics according to which the NVA has to pay enormously higher prices for new procurement items because equipment is getting more and more expensive. Using a figure of 100 for the year 1962-1963, the purchase price for APCs went up to 166 percent within five years, for medium tanks it went up to 246 percent, for fighter aircraft it went up to 320 percent, and for torpedo PT-boats it went up to 483 percent (32). Similarly high rates of increase can be seen in the cost of main repair operations for these weapons systems. Because this cost rise also seems to have continued into the seventies, it would at any rate hardly explain the expansion of the GDR defense budget.

NVA personnel costs have also gone up--for several reasons. First of all, the weapons conversions had their effects in terms of personnel. The introduction of new weapons systems and modern equipment in most cases also leads to a continuing increase in the number of soldiers operating those systems and equipment items. Besides, the maintenance times required for the care and maintenance of these weapons systems were increased. Defense Minister Hoffmann, in his previously quoted speech in Espenhain, mentioned, by way of example, that "the necessary maintenance and repair expenditure for jet fighters has almost tripled compared to the fifties. In some sectors of the air forces, equipped with modern equipment, the share of technical maintenance times out of the total service time has been estimated at 80-90 percent" (33). The resultant cost rise is evident. The manpower increase resulting from weapons conversions causes correspondingly higher personnel costs which constitute an additional burden on the defense budget because of the fact that the GDR, since 1962--when universal military service was introduced--has also several times hiked military pay and allowances for extended-service and career personnel.

Since 1969--the point of departure of the West German government's new eastern and German policy in terms of time--the GDR defense budget by 1977 experienced a 73.5 percent increase. Converted in per-capita terms, the financial expenditure during that interval of time went up from M372 to M654. The policy of detente and "peaceful coexistence" thus did not persuade the GDR to reduce its military and arms expenditures. Instead, we can register an increase at annual growth rates between 7 and 9 percent. It would be wrong to dramatize this development but it would be fatal to poohpoo it. Because the GDR defense budget is subject only to relatively minor inflationary influence, its nominal increase consequently is extensively identical to a real increase in military fighting power.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Law on the 1977 Government Budget Plan" of 15 December 1976, GBL., III, p 535.
2. "Militaerlexikon, East Berlin, 1971, p 235.
3. "Meyers Neues Lexikon," Second Edition, Vol 14, Leipzig, 1976, p 508.
4. "Beitraege zur Militaeroekonomie" (group of authors), East Berlin, 1976, p 115f.
5. Heinz Hoffmann, "Sozialistische Landesverteidigung," Part II, East Berlin, 1971, p 650; id., in a similar vein, NATIONAL-ZEITUNG, 14 April 1971.
6. Quoted from "Zeittafel zur Militaergeschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1949 bis 1968" (group of authors), East Berlin, 1969, p 64.
7. Ibid., p 71.
8. "Handbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik" (group of authors), East Berlin, 1964, p 297.
9. See "Zahlenspiegel. Ein Vergleich Bundersrepublik Deutschland/Deutsche Demokratische Republik," fifth edition, Bonn, 1976, p 8. The data given there are based on a survey entitled "The Military Balance" 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 prepared by the London Institute for Strategic Studies.
10. See "Law on the Creation of the National People's Army and the Ministry of National Defense" of 18 January 1956, GBL., I, p 81.
11. People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic, second legislative term (stenographic minutes), p 327.
12. People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic, second legislative term (stenographic minutes), p 797.
13. See "Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1959," or 1960 and 1961," East Berlin, 1959-1961, p 209 or p 100 and p 132.
14. People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic, third legislative term (stenographic minutes), p 536.
15. Ibid., p 773.
16. See "Explanation on Budget Computation for the Year 1963, "Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik--4. Wahlperiode (Stenographisches Protokoll)," Annex 2, Publication No 28, p 5.

17. See "Law on Universal Military Service" of 24 January 1962, GBL., I, p 2.
18. See "Explanations on Budget Computation for 1963," loc. cit., p 5.
19. People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic--fourth legislative term (stenographic minutes), p 302.
20. Ibid., p 607 or p 778.
21. See "Explanation on Budget Computation for 1964," People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic--fourth legislative term (stenographic minutes), Annex 2, publication No 47, p 4; "Explanation on the Budget Computation for 1965," ibid., Annex 2, publication No 76, p 4; "Explanation on Budget Computation for 1966," People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic--fifth legislative term (stenographic minutes), Annex 2, publication No 9, p 4; and "Budget Computation for 1967," ibid., Annex 1, publication No 46, sheet 2.
22. See "Law on 1968 Government Budget Plan," of 15 December 1967, GBL., I, p 153; "Law on the 1966 Government Budget Plan," of 13 December 1968, GBL., I, p 377; "Law on the 1970 Government Budget Plan," of 17 December 1969, GBL., I, p 264; "Law on the 1971 Government Budget Plan," of 14 December 1970, GBL., I, p 367; "Law on the 1972 Government Plan," of 20 December 1971, GBL., I, p 197; "Law on the 1973 Government Budget Plan," of 14 December 1972; "Law on the 1974 Government Budget Plan," of 19 December 1973; "Law on the 1975 Government Budget Plan," of 19 December 1974, GBL., I, p 574; "Law on the 1976 Government Budget Plan," of 5 December 1975, GBL., I, p 746; and "Law on 1977 Government Budget Plan," loc. cit., footnote 1.
23. See "Budget Computation for 1968" in: People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic--fifth legislative term (stenographic minutes), Annex 1, publication No 60, sheet 2; "Budget Computation of 1969," ibid., Annex 1, publication No 81, sheet 2; "Budget Computation for 1970," ibid., Annex 1, publication No 93, sheet 2; "Budget Computation for 1971," People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic--sixth legislative term (stenographic minutes), Annex 1, publication No 19, sheet 2; "Budget Computation for 1972," ibid., Annex 1, publication No 33, sheet 2; "Budget Computation for 1973," ibid., Annex 1, publication No 46, sheet 2; "Budget Computation for 1974," ibid., Annex 1, publication No 61, sheet 2; and "Budget Computation for 1975," ibid., Annex 1, publication No 75, sheet 2.
24. Compiled until 1974 according to "Statistisches Jahrbuch 1976 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," East Berlin, 1976, p 287.
25. "Beitraege zur Militaeroekonomie," loc. cit., footnote 4, p 42.
26. Ibid., p 40.

27. "Zahlen und Fakten zur Entwicklung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in den Jahren 1971 bis 1975," compiled by the sections of the SED Central Committee and the State Central Administration of Statistics of the GDR, p 34. The material was issued to the delegates to the Ninth SED Party Congress and accredited journalists for information.
28. "Beitraege zur Militaeroekonomie," loc. cit., footnote 4, p 87f.
29. Heinz Hoffmann, "Sozialistische Landesverteidigung," Part III, East Berlin, 1974, p 309f.
30. "Zahlen und Fakten....," loc. cit., footnote 27, p 34.
31. See "Weissbuch 1975/76/Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr," published by the Federal Defense Minister, Bonn, 1976, p 211.
32. See K. Ladewig, H. Franke, and M. Schneider, "The Military-Economic Indexes as Means for Increasing the Effectiveness of Planning," MILITAERWESEN, No 12, 1967, p 1751.
33. Heinz Hoffmann, "Sozialistische Landesverteidigung," Part II, loc. cit., p. 310.

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EAST GERMANY

MAJ GEN HAMPF DISCUSSES PARTY ELECTIONS

East Berlin VOLKSARMEE in German No 11, 14 Mar 77 p 3

[Article by Maj Gen E. Hampf, Deputy Chief of the NVA [National People's Army] Main Political Administration: "Party Elections -- A Period of High Political-Ideological Activity"]

[Text] Party elections of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany are highpoints of political life. They strengthen the ranks of communists. They draw the masses even closer together around the party. They are always starting points for new initiatives for successful progress everywhere, including military protection, in the German Democratic Republic. In more than 3,000 SED primary organizations and party groups in the National People's Army and the Border Troops of the GDR a reckoning of accounts is being made as to how the communists at the head of their military collectives can realize the leading role of the party and the resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress.

It is already apparent that the party elections represent a broad exchange of opinion and experience in which many male and female comrades are speaking their piece. They are developing new ideas, presenting suggestions and conceiving new resolutions to further strengthen the combat power of primary organizations, to increase the activity of each communist, to conduct offensive

political-ideological work and to consolidate the close bond of confidence between all servicemen, border soldiers and civilian employees with their Marxist-Leninist party.

Their basic premise is that the stronger the party and the more toughened the communists, the higher the combat power and combat readiness of the troops, headquarters and installations and the more reliably will the military class mission be accomplished. In the NVA this is the all important question, the central link in the chain. And when the documents of the Ninth Party Congress and the party instruction again emphasize that the most important source of the power and strength of our army is the further increase of the leading role of the party, it is only logical that discussions center around how one can even more successfully realize the resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress. This includes answering such questions as:

- How are the resolutions of our central committee, the stipulations of party instructions and political directives converted into the actual conditions of our own area of responsibility; how are the orders of the minister for national defense or orders and regulations in general carried out?
- Will political-ideological work as the core of party work do complete justice to the increased requirements resulting from the strategy and tactics of the party as well as from the aggravated class conflict situation in the area of ideology?
- What influence do the primary organizations and party groups exert on political education and training of servicemen, on combat training or combat service, on the overall atmosphere of military, social and cultural life in their units and collectives?
- Do the communists act in accordance with the scales and requirements of the party statute and the party instruction; are they aware of the dimension of the responsibility behind the words: Where there is a comrade, there is the party?

It is right that all reporting election meetings proceed on the basis of the great associations of our time, of domestic and foreign political problems, of the basic goals of our socialist military policy.

The party elections are a period of high political-ideological activity which challenges each comrade to search deeper into the content of ideas of the Ninth Party Congress, into the essence of our policy and make all servicemen aware of this. The first prerequisite for this realization is clarity about the policy of the Ninth Party Congress.

The prerequisite for effective ideological work to accomplish all political and military tasks assigned to the army is an understanding of the totality of the resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress since our military class mission exists in an indissoluble union with the generalized experiences and teachings in the central committee report at the party congress as well as with our goals which have experienced a comprehensive grounding in the party program. Each comrade must understand and then consciously so act that the NVA and Border Troops of the GDR, guided by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, make an active contribution to the realization of the general line of the party. They bear a high responsibility for unceasing strengthening of the defense readiness and the collective military protection of socialism. This is a decisive guarantee for lasting protection of peace and guaranteeing favorable conditions for the continued forming of the developed socialist society and the creation of basic prerequisites for the gradual transition to communism in the German Democratic Republic.

The continued forming of the socialist society and its protection against enemy attacks is a powerful creative process which must

be consciously accomplished by millions of people, guided by the Marxist-Leninist party, on the basis of objective laws.

The policy directed at the wellbeing of the people can be accomplished only with high consciousness. The primary prerequisite here is comprehensive dissemination of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the closest association with the resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress. This is the affair of all comrades of our party. The party instruction thus states that communists must untiringly strive to master Marxism-Leninism, to disseminate it, to rigorously represent it, to be active in party schooling and to participate in political schooling and social scientific training and continuation training or in the party training year. Only Marxism-Leninism makes possible a profound understanding of the objective laws of socialist revolution, socialist construction and its military protection. In the reporting election meetings it is thus a question of discussing and composing such resolutions as will make communists even more capable of philosophical-scientific and relevant agitation and propaganda. This is an important condition for bringing the policy of the party convincingly closer to all servicemen so that they can consciously perceive their responsibility to socialism and our fatherland.

Here the association which exists between Marxist-Leninist theory, its conversion and the development by communists as well as by all servicemen becomes particularly clear. Through comprehensive dissemination of the scientific philosophy they receive an even greater insight into the laws of nature and society, the sense of our policy and the necessity of not letting up in military efforts.

Only so can the soldier personality be developed, the conscious

creativity of servicemen be realized. Of course, at reporting election meetings positions will be taken about affairs of actual concern in each party and military collective and about the tasks given in the party instruction and political directive. This refers to the development of inner party life, the state of training and education, the realization of competition procedures, service, work and living conditions, spiritual and cultural life and all questions of the military routine.

High Demands on Combat Power and Combat Readiness

No matter how much we go into details, accomplishment of the resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress in the NVA and Border Troops of the GDR depends primarily on how each individual understands that the protection of socialism-communism and peace places the highest demands on the combat power of the socialist armed forces, on the continual combat readiness of troops and headquarters and on the operational readiness of each individual soldier. It thus remains a primary commandment of ideological work in the NVA and the Border Troops of the GDR to make all servicemen fully aware of the class mission of socialist armed forces. This should always be done on the premise that it is important to offensively unmask the aggressive, reactionary and cynical nature of imperialism, to awaken relentless hate against the class enemy and to logically struggle with bourgeoisie ideology and all phenomena of ideological diversion. Education in alertness and continually higher combat readiness is an important component of our party work. We must provide the justification as to why high performance in military service, good training results, iron military discipline and developed socialist connections are required in military collectives at all times.

When the comrades of our party always adopt a firm class

viewpoint in regard to the problems of our social development and the international class struggle as well as in regard to the high demands that military service places on them personally and logically represent this, they will do justice to their role as fighters in the advance guard of the workers' party, will shine forth on the nonparty members and will bring socialist consciousness to the masses. This is also an important matter of the party elections. They should include every member of the army and border troops. All are included in the great exchange of opinions.

No one stands to one side during the daily political talk. Only in this way can we awaken new initiatives on a mass basis for the realization of our political and military tasks, particularly in the competition to honor the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

As our comrade Erich Honecker, the secretary general of the SED Central Committee, expressed it, the essence of the struggle and life of communists for the millions of builders and protectors of the new society consists in leading by showing the way, giving an example and proceeding firmly. The party elections will bring us a step closer to mobilizing our forces so as to further logically realize the resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress.

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EAST GERMANY

OBSERVATION OF TRANSPORT REGULATIONS STRESSED

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 3, Mar 77 pp 108-110

[Article by Lt Col K.-H. Girt and Lt Col E. Quinger, lawyers]

[Text] 1. Military Transport Training--One Element in the Overall Program of Combat Training

An essential element in the overall program of combat training is military transport training. The basic determinations of DV [implementing regulation] 19/2--Military Transport Regulation--apply to military transports. It was issued effective 1 January 1964 with the agreement of the Ministry for Transportation.

Military transports today, to an increasing extent, are carried out under combatlike conditions. Loading and unloading are done with protective masks in place, in total darkness, using permanent and temporary loading and unloading installations, at unfamiliar railroad stations, and so forth.

In spite of these conditions, which are getting more and more complicated and which make high demands on the physical and mental performance capability of the army members, it can be determined today that the number of accidents during preparation for and carrying out military transports has not risen. On the contrary, there is a large number of units which have not had any accidents in the past few years while moving troops by rail despite the high intensity of military transport. The following formations are representative of this: "Georg Schuhmann," "August Bebel," "Erich Panndorf," "Robert Uhrig" and "Max Roscher." In these units the military transport regulation is being precisely observed; the transport leaders did full justice to their responsibility.

Now and then it is erroneously claimed that the determinations of DV 19/2 prevent combatlike military transport training. But the practice of many units proves that the provisions of the military transport regulation guarantee that the tasks set can be reliably fulfilled and, in so doing, the life and health of army members can be protected and the fighting and

transport equipment efficiently serviced, loaded and transported. Dangers for the members of the army involved and equipment almost always result if military transports are not organized and carried out precisely according to the terms of the service regulation.

Besides the extremely positive development in the area of military transport training and with the reduction in transport accidents, we nonetheless cannot overlook the fact that the provisions of the military transport regulation are not always observed and consistently adhered to by all units. In individual cases serious violations of the safety provisions results in incidents. As the investigations revealed, such accidents and losses are in no case unavoidable. Superficiality, negligence, routine, and ignorance of military determinations were established as causes. High-level military knowledge and ability, political consciousness of responsibility, and consistent implementation of commands and service regulations, however, are important prerequisites for trouble-free, combatlike military transport training. In this sense, the commanders at all levels and the transport leaders utilized by them have a great responsibility.

Incidents and military transport accidents, however, also show that members of the army, in a series of cases, disregard commands and directions received in spite of prior extensive instruction, and they bring about situations involving danger. Without raising any claim to completeness, the following report explains several important provisions of DV 19/2 which are important for a high degree of safety in carrying out military transports. The authors are guided in this by an analysis of the accidents and losses that have occurred in the carrying out of military transports to the extent these events have been investigated by the military judiciary.

2. General Provisions of Military Transport Regulation DV 19/2

In order to guarantee that the troops to be transported by rail reach the appointed place on time and in complete combat-readiness, the commanders and political organs must thoroughly prepare the army members for the combat tasks to be fulfilled and must provide complete organization and strict discipline.

In the interest of high military safety, the following are among the areas forbidden to army members in transport:

- leaving the transport without permission,
- touching electrical installations,
- endangering their own safety and railroad operation by their behavior at railroad stations,
- entering or leaving the cars before the command to do so was given (not applicable for guards and patrols),

- crossing the tracks without the authorization of the transport leader,
- crossing the tracks in front of moving locomotives or cars, standing on the tracks, moving around on the rails and ties,
- crawling under or between the cars, climbing over car buffers or couplings, walking between uncoupled cars,
- jumping on or off cars during the trip and going from car to car as well as stopping in door openings,
- staying in vehicles and on open cars during the trip without the command of the transport leader.

These determinations contained in subparagraph 13 of the military transport regulation and reproduced here only in part are equally binding on superiors and subordinates and should always be the object of the instruction on record for mandatory implementation before every rail transport.¹ These instructions must not appear to be a formality. It must be emphatically pointed out to the army members what dangers can arise if the military regulations are not observed.²

3. Preparation of Military Transports

In the following only some of the regulations of DV 19/2 will be mentioned which serve to avoid accidents and losses. For example, the regulation must be observed that on cars directly in front of or behind the troop cars, no technical combat equipment and devices may be loaded whose parts (gun barrels, crane jibs or other parts that extend out quite far) point in the direction of the troop cars. The regulations of civil transport organs that apply in these matters are the authority for arranging the train, incorporating protective cars and other safety measures. Furthermore, all parts of technical combat equipment and devices which can move, rotate, or slide must be secured or bolted so that they cannot exceed the clearance limits of the GDR Reichsbahn (in this regard, see Appendix 23 of DV 19/2). The bolting system must be such that it cannot work loose during the trip.

4. Duties of the Military Transport

The commander of the unit designates a transport leader and a deputy for each transport. The transport leader is the superior of all army members of the military transport (see subparagraph 42). Of special importance is the regulation contained in the military transport instruction that the transport leader must issue a transport command in which, among other things, the following services are to be ordered (subparagraph 44 [1]):

- loading and unloading officer,
- loading and unloading command,
- duty officer (OvD), his aides and the watch command.

The transport order is to be prepared in writing. In this regard, express reference must be made to the fact that a special transport order must be worked out for round-trip transfer. This is necessary because the conditions for the organization and carrying out of military transports are often quite different. Subparagraph 49 of the military transport regulation states; "As preparation for the march to the entraining point and for entraining, the commander or the transport leader acting in his place must make a reconnaissance." This measure makes it possible for the commander or the transport leader appointed by him to detect in a timely manner local conditions at the entraining point and possible sources of danger and to react properly to them.

The military transport regulation further requires that the transport leader makes known important information about the organization of the loading to the commanders of the units involved in the transport. Such information comprises, among other things, the content of the transport order, the distribution of the units, and the equipment for the available car space according to the loading plan and measures which resulted from the reconnaissance and which concern safety during loading. The transport leader, furthermore, must personally assign the duties of the military transport and, in so doing, check whether the members of the army assigned know their duties. During loading he must see to it that the combat equipment is quickly loaded on the cars and must check to see that it is also properly secured.³

The health and the life of our army members and the constant readiness for use of combat equipment during railroad transport marches depend substantially on how the safety provisions, especially during loading and unloading, are observed. Accidents and losses are also avoidable in this area of combat training if the requirements of the service regulations, especially DV 19/2, are observed and consistently implemented.

Situations of considerable danger also always develop when individual army members on their own leave the car or a different stop than designated for them and move in a disorganized way in or about the train. Such behavior is very dangerous for life and health especially when it is dark.

Unfortunately now and then during control checks, it is ascertained that members of the army, in spite of thorough instructions, violate these simple behavior standards, and so thus completely unnecessarily get themselves into dangerous situations. Therefore, in this connection, mention must be made here also of the duties of the military collectives and of every army member to see to it that the service regulations are observed and that no one behaves carelessly or dangerously. Often a comradely suggestion is all that it takes for this. In this connection it is important that the responsibility of the superiors is complemented by joint social responsibility.

During the trip the transport leader must see to it that the provisions of the military transport regulation are observed and that steps are taken to

avoid accidents. Once again it should be pointed out that the superiors of the units on the transport are subordinate to the transport leader. They must also help see to it that military order is kept and that the transport regulations are observed by the members of the units.

Frequently the transport leaders and the other superiors will have to give consideration to the fact that NVA [National People's Army] members are involved in military transports for whom such a military move represents so-called "new ground."

The result of this involves special conclusions for the content and the methodology of instruction and assignments. They are, therefore, to be carried out with special care. The same also holds true for the control activity of superiors.

To an increasing extent military transports take place on electrically-operated lines of the GDR Reichsbahn. On the basis of the additional dangers resulting from this, special safety measures were established which are contained in DV 19/2, Appendix 17. The most important are mentioned below:

- clearance to live lines and parts must be at least 1.50 meters for all activities,
- staying on the tops of cars, vehicles, or devices as well as on elevated car parts is forbidden,
- in all troop transport cars there must be an instructional leaflet about conduct on electrically-operated railroad lines,
- the transport leader must instruct all army members.

In spite of these clear-cut determinations, which are clearly elucidated in on-going instruction, dangerous situations unfortunately occur again and again and, in isolated instances, there are even accidents because the members of the army carelessly disregard duties and prohibitions. Note the following example of this:

Between the upper edge of the cab of a loaded "Ural" truck and the live overhead line (15,000 v) there was a clearance of only 0.96 m. Despite this, during a stop one army member involved in the transport climbed on the cab in order to close the open hatch. Only because of the level-headed action of a responsible army member could an accident of serious consequence be prevented.

For the loading and transport of tank equipment the regulations contained in CV 051/0/001--Tank Security--Section XII, p 12 ff, apply in addition to the provisions of the military transport regulation. Among other things they say:

--Antennas are to be taken down, caterpillar tracks are to be tightened as for travel on roads, the turret is to be turned to the back and the cannon to be lashed. The tank commander must check this last point in every case.

--During loading and unloading, the assigned location of a driver must be at least the distance of a car's length away. The assigner must never go backwards. If two vehicles are loaded on one car, the place assigned must depend on the position of the vehicle already loaded.

--During the transport, staying in and on tank equipment is categorically forbidden. Exceptions can be authorized only by the transport leader (DV 051/0/001, XII/14, subparagraph 51 and DV 19/2, subparagraph 13).

The principle contained in DV 051/0/001, II/17, subparagraph 19, that the driver must not move the equipment without an order by the person responsible for the vehicle, also applies during loading and unloading of tank equipment.

5. Concluding Remarks

Military-transport training is an important component of combat training. Military mastery and a high political sense of responsibility are unalterable prerequisites for carrying out military transports.

The protection of the life and health of army members and the constant combat-readiness of the equipment require that the provisions of the military transport regulation be observed exactly. Only in this way are accidents avoidable. Eliminating dangerous situations and thus preventing accidents are a general social concern to which--on the basis of the experiences of the best units--superiors at all levels, social organizations, military collectives, and every single army member must do justice.

FOOTNOTES

1. In this regard, see also Instruction 010/1/003--Instructions on Legal Regulations and Military Determinations, dated 24 May 1973.
2. W. Langguth, "Accident Prevention Order of the NVA--Instruction Duties of the Service Regulations." MILITAERTECHNIK, No 6, 1976, p 258.
3. Ballentin, "Accident-Free--Also By Train." VOLKSARMEE, No 29/76, p 8.

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EAST GERMANY

COMMENTARY PUBLISHED ON CONTEMPORARY CATHOLICISM

Mutual Interests of Christians and Marxists

East Berlin BEGEGNUNG in German Feb 77 pp 5-7

[Article by Eduard Bahsler: "Christ and the Socialist Way of Life--Some Thoughts on Guidelines for Catholics"]

[Text] At its ninth party congress in January 1976, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany passed a program which devotes a momentous chapter to the socialist way of life. In this connection, it is expounded and proved that the way and means of social life and individual behavior characteristic of a developed socialist society are becoming increasingly pronounced in all spheres of life. This is true of work and leisure, of collaboration within the labor collective, of family life and of all the other aspects of the citizens' way of life.

For us Christians, the question arises as to the extent to which we--as socialist citizens who day in and day out, conscious of our duty and responsibility, work to strengthen and consolidate the German Democratic Republic--can also practice a way of life which is described as socialist.

What actually is meant by a socialist way of life? The SED program pronounced clearly that what is meant by it is the way and means, based on relationships of socialist power and ownership, by which the working people, conscious of being free and well-educated socialist citizens, shape their life in all social spheres and in their relations with one another. The socialist way of life comprises people's labor, their political activity, their activity in the residential area, in the family, in sports and recreation.

The Significance of Labor

If, to start with, we place emphasis on labor, it is because clearly people's entire way of life is doubtless formed very much by the labor of the individual and of the collective. We Christians, whose life and work spring

from faith, know exactly how urgently the Christian gospel time and again points to service for one's fellow man. Unmistakably, it also calls for service to the community, and all this requires labor. The significance of labor in the life of humanity becomes apparent in the pronouncements of the Second Vatican Council. The Constitution "The Church in the Modern World" (chapter III, article 67) states:

"Human labor which is conducted in the production and exchange of goods and in supplying economic services is superior to all other elements of economic life, which after all are only tools. For this labor, whether it is conducted on one's own responsibility or in someone else's service, is more immediate. It comes immediately from the human person, who in a sense stamps the things of nature with his seal and subdues them to his will. It is ordinarily by his labor that a man supports himself and his family, is joined to his fellowmen and serves them, can exercise genuine charity and offer his partnership in the further development of God's creation. Indeed we hold that in offering his labor to God man becomes associated with the redemptive work itself of Jesus Christ, Who conferred an eminent dignity on labor when He worked with His own hands at Nazareth. From all [these considerations] derives everyone's duty to labor faithfully, and also his right to work."

These pronouncements of Vatican II make it clear what significance labor has in the Catholic view and how it fertilizes the development of the personality and of the community. Labor as the basis of one's way of life thus directly serves man.

The SED emphasizes in its program that the socialist way of life is founded on the socialist way of production and that it includes the constant raising of people's material and spiritual standard of living. Here too parallels become apparent to the pronouncements of the Second Vatican Council, which are binding for us Catholic Christians today and in the future. The same chapter of the Pastoral Constitution deals with the whole course of fruitful labor and with it having to be adapted primarily to a person's necessities and vital needs. However, only that kind of labor can be fruitful for the community of people to a full extent which is based on social ownership of the means of production.

If time and again it is rightly emphasized that labor and leisure form one whole, the church tells us just as clearly that working people must be given the opportunity of themselves developing their own abilities and their person in executing their labor and that, in this, time and forces must be fully employed with the appropriate degree of responsibility. This means that in regard to leisure the opportunities must exist for cultivating family, cultural and religious life, which is to be conducted in the necessary peace and leisure. Here the mutual effect of labor and reproduction of labor become apparent. This means that everyone must have the time and opportunity for freely developing those forces and talents which form the basis of being

a complete person. Therefore, the SED program does not only talk about the execution of meaningful labor but states the requirement of leisure, of education and culture, of health and recreation and, not least, that of security in old age.

The Political Commitment Is Part of It

The socialist way of life is also inseparably connected with active political activity, with a concrete and conscious political commitment. For Christians in the GDR, this political commitment occurs primarily in the bodies of the National Front and in the Christian Democratic Union. This is a political party in which Christian citizens of democratic conviction associate in order to work for the well-being of man and his community out of a feeling of Christian responsibility. In this political party, Christians, of whatever church, have set themselves the task of cooperating in the establishment of socialism in our republic, in strengthening the socialist community of states and in creating a lasting peaceful order in Europe.

This offer of political commitment and the fact that Christian citizens are increasingly taking advantage of the offer are likewise in full accord with the pronouncements of the Catholic Church. In article 73 of chapter IV of the Constitution "The Church in the Modern World" the council emphasizes that there is nothing as important for developing a political life which is truly worthy of man as the cultivation of a sense of justice, benevolence and service for the common good and the creation of firm basic convictions about the true nature of political community, about its aim and the correct use and limits of state power.

A way of life thus also includes the conscious belonging to a political community. This community is manifold and various in our world of today. But a political community has meaning and can be described as human only if it really serves the common good. And the common good comprises the sum total of all those conditions of social life through which individuals, families and social groups can attain their own perfection unimpeded. It is to be viewed as a political tie of the common good and never as contradicting the fundamental Christian conviction.

The Second Vatican Council also presents information about the specific nature of a Catholic's political activity. In article 75 of the Pastoral Constitution it is formulated as follows: "Christians shall appreciate the vocation in the political community which is quite particularly their own. They shall set an example on how one acts out of a sense of responsibility and serves the common good. They shall show in practice how authority can be harmonized with freedom, personal initiative with ties of solidarity in a common whole, true unity with fruitful diversity." And the same chapter states further on: "Honest and just, full of love and political courage, he shall devote himself to the welfare of all."

Whoever, therefore, makes such a way of life, desired by the ecclesiastical authority, his own by no means contradicts the programmatic declaration of

the Marxist-Leninist party in our country, which emphasizes time and again that a socialist way of life requires a conscious party-line commitment to the socialist social order.

A socialist way of life and turning one's thought and action to the common good means at the same time, to render service to one's fellow man within the residential community. A Christian cannot be indifferent to how his neighbor and fellow man in his residential area is faring, to what problems, worries and questions occupy the individual within the community. It is, therefore, also part of the socialist way of life to make oneself available for activity in the residential area. This occurs in public life, in the committees of the National Front and in other bodies of society. But our parishes too offer a rich field of activity for this. Suffice it to mention the manifold activities of Caritas, family work or the Kolping families [young Catholic workers associations]. In this connection, it should be our task to coordinate work for the common good even more comprehensively than previously with efforts of the social forces.

Interpreting the socialist way of life, the SED program points to the formation of marriage and family relations, founded on love and respect, understanding and mutual aid in everyday life and on joint responsibility for the children. The socialist community ascribes great importance precisely to marriage and the family. Not least, this finds expression in the comprehensive sociopolitical program of our state. Thereby, the pertinent social and material prerequisites are provided for a good marriage and family life. Under these aspects, there are many agreements between a Christian's concept of marriage and family and the concept of them by the socialist state.

Finally: If the socialist way of life also includes the fight against egoism and greed, against heartlessness and ruthlessness in human relations, against hypocrisy and cynicism, against unsocial behavior and abuse of alcohol, this can only receive unreserved approval by any consistent Christian. All these are phenomena which deeply contradict the Christian concept of dignity and the human mission. Here too Christians and Marxists find common ground for cooperation in practice.

One may therefore reach the conclusion that the human image characterized by Christian ethics and the image of the personality bearing the stamp of a socialist way of life agree in many and essential features. Despite remaining differences in weltanschauung, it must be our task in a brotherly attitude always to make uniting factors the focal point of our action--for the sake of true humanity.

Criticism of Official Church Policy

East Berlin BEGEGNUNG in German Feb 77 pp 11-12

[Article by Johannes Kubitzky]

[Text] Who does not know Goethe's "Sorcerer's Apprentice," the story, set in verse, of the old broom which the apprentice, in the master's absence, overestimating his ability and out of curiosity, turns into a water carrier and which the apprentice, once he has got it going, cannot stop because he has forgotten the relevant magic formula? The broom--an inanimate tool used for removing dirt--suddenly becomes alive and unfolds an activity of such dimensions that one can hardly find "refuge" any more....

If one looks at the practice of church community life--particularly at the relationship between clerics and laymen--in some areas of our country, one is perforce reminded of this story of the broom brought to life.

When Laymen Came "of Age"

The [Vatican] Council assured the Christian people their majority and devoted a separate document to them. It transferred tasks to the "laymen" which are his--and only his. These vested tasks of his very own are by no means exhausted in reading the Epistle during service, in cleaning the church and in an obedient yes to the instructions of the head of the parish. The layman represents the church--and thus the living Christ--in the realm of labor, in his profession, family and society. He must create his point of view and adhere to it. Through him, the love of God for man must be seen to be alive "on the spot" and be manifested by him full time.

And so, in a post-Vatican Council euphoria, Christians associated on the basis of the experience of a decades-long lay apostolate. They discussed the papal pronouncements, gave their opinions on questions of Christian life and committed themselves to turning the "aggiornamento" into action. However, all too soon the limits became apparent and a lifted finger bade a halt: the council was over.

Its continuation and actualization in the territories was attempted through pastoral synods. But one was not prepared to change the old canon law about the holding of such synods and to adapt it to the spirit of the council. Thus, lay representatives got into the assembly hall of the synod only on the basis of papal dispensation.

But even before, the questions had begun to be raised. What were to be the agenda of the pastoral synod? What problems confront Catholic Christians in the GDR?

And thus began the dialog which invariably starts with questions. The church administration raised questions by issuing 90,000 suggestion cards. The Catholics replied--sparsely and somewhat softly--by submitting 11,906 replies or requests--4,961 individual and 6,945 group requests.

The central office of the pastoral synod in Dresden, headed by Monsignor Grande, on 10 February 1972 issued a statistical summary of all proposals for the pastoral synod. This sizable work, which groups the letters received according to subject categories and, i.e., presents statistics according to districts of jurisdiction and parishes, unquestionably needs to be consulted before any light is thrown on individual documents and results of the synod. For the scope and value of a reply can be judged only in the light of the question.

What is interesting right off is the plethora of strata, groups, groupings and circles (about 150) which participated in the preparations through questions or requests. Summed up in 14 categories, they provide good insight into the life of the church and, beyond that, enlightenment and knowledge to those who talk about a "suppressed" or "persecuted" church in the GDR. Thus we find among these categories 10 circles of priests, 5 lay councils, 1 priests and lay conference, 5 guideline offices (e.g., curates' reports), 7 groups of participants in the service of the church, 6 specialists commissions, 3 groups of theology students, 5 groups made up of various orders, 16 young circles, 12 family circles, 8 academicians circles and 42 "other" groups. The spectrum ranges from the diocese council via the lay worship circles, the rosary fraternity and circus curacy to the midwives' labor week.

Suggestion, Requests...

All turned in their request cards, all joined the large-scale questioning and placed their names on the synod's list of requests.

Just as important and interesting as knowing the identity of the questioners of these many strata are the requests they sent to Dresden:

Subject Group 1: Promulgation of Faith and Implementation of Faith

2,300 requests (901 individual requests, 1,399 group requests):

Subject matter and language of promulgation; taking into account the situation of the audience; priests and laymen as promulgators; promulgation of faith for adults and youth; religious education; publications; faith aids; church radio work, et al.

Subject Group 2: Prayer and Church Service Activity

3,463 requests (1,601 individual requests, 1,862 group requests):

Spirituality, prayer, church service with or without a priest, church prayers, order of holidays, practice of repentance, liturgical dress, et al.

Subject Group 3: Marriage and Family

928 requests (324 individual requests, 604 group requests):

Marriage and sex education, mixed marriages, divorce, marriages which have failed, second marriages, women's equal rights and professional activity, children's education, et al.

Subject Group 4: Charity Work and Parish

1,033 requests (358 individual requests, 675 group requests):

Caritas, charity institutions, service to the sick, curate's care for those living alone, curate's care for the old, parish work, engagement of parish members, informal groups in parishes, cooperation between parishes, et al.

Subject Group 5: Apostolate and World Service

930 requests (363 individual requests, 567 group requests):

Testimony of the church; Christ and socialism; social commitment; apostolate in trade and in the plants, in leisure and communities of common interest; Christ and politics; military service; social collaboration, et al.

Subject Group 6: Systems and Services

2,371 requests (1,101 individual requests, 1,270 group requests):

Training and advanced training of priests and lay theologians, personnel and long-range planning, separated priests, deacons, formation of cadres, leadership activity, social justice for people participating in the service of the church, administrative reform, rationalization, et al.

Subject Group 7: Ecumenical Matters

737 requests (247 individual requests, 490 group requests):

Ecumenical church services and collaboration of parishes, open communion and intercommunion, ecumenical groups and intramural groups, ecumenical church building, projects, institutions, collaboration of church administrations, et al.

...and What Became of Them

What has become of these requests? Have they been processed in toto or at least in part into the preliminary documents and later into the documents of the pastoral synod?

The total result is known: the synod bequeathed 11 documents as equipment for the path of the GDR church through the next few decades. (Cf also BEGEGNUNG 10/75, pp 4-8.) But what now? What is the practical result?

The sorcerer's apprentice in Goethe's poem was unable to stop the broom once it had been brought to life. Nor can God's people, come of age, be turned around once they have been called and asked. Appeasements, warnings, farfetched "scriptural proofs" to document the "order" of the community of Jesus brought about through historical coincidences are not the kind of magical formulas suited to again establish the onetime "peace" in the parishes. The people of God have awakened! The palette of today's Catholicism, after all, ranges from movement of traditionalists set on the Latin mass to intramural communities gathering around the living room table to celebrate the eucharist.

Within this gamut also stands the Catholic Church of the GDR after the pastoral synod.

In the beginning of the work of the synod there was the questioning. Was it the questioning of the sorcerer's apprentice?

Data on the Freedom of Churches in the GDR:

--The freedom of conscience and belief is vested in the constitution (Article 20).

--There are 8 Protestant churches, the Catholic Church and 27 other religious associations in the GDR.

--The protestant churches alone maintain 52 hospitals, 87 homes for physically and mentally disabled, 280 old people's and nursing homes, 112 homes of recuperation, 23 children's homes and 300 children's day care establishments as well as 550 community care stations.

--The Protestant churches own 200,000 hectares of agricultural land.

--The Catholic Church has 40 hospitals and 167 other ecclesiastical homes for social purposes.

--Smaller scale confessional associations maintain 2 deaconesses' homes with 122 sisters.

--At 6 universities of the GDR, there are departments of Protestant theology with about 500 students. Additionally, there are 5 church training institutes with also 50 students. The number of theology students is not subject to state restriction. This is also true of training priests of the Catholic Church, which is proceeding in three church-owned colleges or seminaries.

--The religious associations issue newspapers and books in their own publishing houses. Periodically there appear 30 theological and church papers, periodicals and folders of information. The Main Bible Society publishes half a million bibles a year. Twelve percent of all titles of annual GDR publishing are of an ecclesiastical or religious content.

--The state provides considerable financial grants to religious associations--for hospitals, old people's and nursing homes, pastors' salaries (more than M 10 million a year), for maintaining ecclesiastical structure (M 1.2 million a year), for theology students (M 4 million a year).

8790

CSO: 2300

HUNGARY

HUNGARIAN CULTURE MINISTER INTERVIEWED IN CUBA

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 18 Feb 77 pp 48-49

[Interview with Imre Pozsgay, the Hungarian minister of culture by Luis Baez]

[Text] Imre Pozsgay, a member of the Central Committee of POSH [expansion unknown] and his country's culture minister, spent a week in Cuba at the head of an official delegation that attended the ceremonies celebrating Hungarian Culture Day in our country.

During his stay in our country Pozsgay held talks with Comrade Armando Hart, a member of the Political Bureau and the minister of culture, and with Comrade Antonio Perez Herrero, a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

The 43-year old Pozsgay has been minister of culture since July of last year. He is a PhD candidate in philosophy. He received his university degree in the department of history and Marxism-Leninism from the Lenin Institute in 1957. He has been a member of POSH since 1950. From 1957 to 1965 he was the head of the Marxism-Leninism evening university. In 1965 he was appointed head of the department of agitation and propaganda in a party district committee and was later the committee's ideological secretary. He subsequently became assistant head of the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee of POSH and the assistant director of the party's theory magazine. He was deputy minister of culture starting in July 1975.

During the activities held in our country Minister Pozsgay was accompanied by Comrades Quintin Pino Machado, Alfredo Guevara and Rolando Rodriguez, who are head officials of the Ministry of Culture.

His interview with BOHEMIA's representative took place in one of the rooms of the protocol house in which he was staying. Also present was Comrade Vilmus Meruk, the Hungarian ambassador in Cuba.

Pozsgay began by relating his impressions of his talk with Comrade Hart.

"My talks with Comrade Hart," Pozsgay stated, "were frank and cordial. We talked about international relations, both between our two countries and with the rest of the socialist countries."

"We also examined specific matters. For example, we offered to provide each other detailed information of our experiences with the problems of copyrights."

Later on he stated that during the talks he had informed Comrade Hart of the spirit in which Hungary was preparing to attend the Belgrade Conference.

"We are going to Belgrade with a clear conscience. We won't let the imperialists turn the conference into a courtroom for providing explanations. We do not accept the attempts to distort the Helsinki agreements. We have nothing to be ashamed of in the cultural field."

Pozsgay paused and asserted:

"Socialist countries have done much more than any other country to promote the cause of culture."

At another point in the talk he recalled that after the unsuccessful counter-revolution in 1956 one of the main resolutions quickly made was connected with the principles of cultural policy within the party.

"In 1958," Pozsgay pointed out, "the party approved the principles of cultural policy. Even today we can utilize them because they are still valid in our relations with artists and intellectuals."

In discussing the achievements in the cultural field he stressed that the major ones have been in music and cinema.

He also said that great progress had been made in the theater and that the number of premieres of new Hungarian dramas had increased significantly. "We hope," he commented, "that the result of this movement will be a renewal of dramatic literature."

He became somewhat pensive and added:

"We still have shortcomings. There is a certain degree of confusion in the fine arts, mainly in painting. It's not that there are problems with the artists, but there's a certain stagnation that is showing up in the search for means of expression, which we feel is a common problem throughout the world.

"We also lack great novels. In this regard Cuba and Latin America have been surpassing us. We are working zealously in the search for a better quality novel."

He then referred to the campaigns that imperialism is unleashing against the socialist countries.

"We are reacting in the cultural field against those attacks just as we do in other fields. Our enemies usually select several socialist countries as targets. For example, last November a very cruel campaign was unleashed against the GDR. Now they're involved in a fierce campaign against Czechoslovakia.

"Generally they attack us by distorting the spirit of the Helsinki agreements and fallaciously bringing up what they call human rights. But the whole world knows quite well that, in general, in both culture and freedom nothing has given more than socialism."

Rounding out this concept he said:

"As Comrade Hart said so well, our enemies have many weak points. We should be the ones who are on the offensive."

He commented that the amateur movement in his country is being undertaken communally, in houses of culture, in labor unions, in which there exists an intense artistic life that they themselves promote and channel in their own enterprises.

He said that the appreciation of artistic values in his country is very great. He underscored that Hungary, with a population of 10 million, sells 6 million tickets a year to artistic events.

He stressed that Hungary has achieved a quite high cultural level among the population and that the masses play a creative role.

During the conversation he mentioned that literary criticism plays a major role since in addition to being a sincere and truthful source of information, its duty is to guide the public within a Marxist-Leninist spirit.

The comrades from the protocol arm of the Foreign Relations Ministry notify him that the cars are ready to leave for the airport. During the final minutes of the interview Imre Pozsgay commented:

"We are indebted to our Cuban brothers, a debt that we hope to pay when we celebrate Cuban Culture Day in Hungary. We are very thankful for all the attention that you have shown us and for the very kind treatment that we received from Comrade Hart, who is a truly brilliant man."

He stands up and begins saying good-bye to the comrades who have attended to him in protocol house No. 3. Before getting into the car he tells us:

"I am leaving deeply impressed with Cuba, its people and its leaders. Really, I am leaving deeply impressed."

POLAND

'TRYBUNA LUDU' DECRIES VANCE'S 'UNREALISTIC PROPOSALS'

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 8 Apr 77 p 7 AU

[Article by M. Berezowski: "After the Moscow Talks by the U.S. State Secretary--Unrealistic Mission"]

[Text] The American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was regarded in the past as a negotiator with a "lucky hand." In contrast to that renown his first important mission after taking office--the negotiations in Moscow on Strategic Arms Limitation--ended in failure. For it is difficult to achieve miracles when your hands are tied with unrealistic proposals brought in the diplomatic luggage.

The basic aim of Vance's trip was to start the SALT-2 talks on the introduction of limitations on development of the offensive arsenal of strategic arms of the USSR and the United States, consisting of long range missiles and planes as well as nuclear warheads. These talks were suspended by the American side, formally because of the election campaign but in effect because of the pressure by the opponents of accord to which the administration of then President Ford could not stand up.

The common Soviet-American guidelines established during the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford in Vladivostok in November 1974 envisaged a quick conclusion of successful SALT-2 talks, a common numerical calling for strategic means of delivery (2,400 for each side--later the USSR proposed to lower the figure to the 2,100-2,200 level, and the so-called multiple warheads (1,320) was agreed to at the time. Some matters were left to be finally dealt with during a visit to Moscow by the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Immovability

Visiting the USSR in January 1976 Kissinger, under the provisions of the Vladivostok meeting, considered it imperative to take into account some Soviet reservations (made a long time previously) connected with the introduction of the cruise missile. The Pentagon tried to include the cruise missile in the non-strategic categories and therefore to exclude it from the prepared accord, even though the Pentagon tried to use it to tilt the strategic scale in its favor.

Kissinger was to return to Moscow in February last year to finalize the accord, but he never did. His journey was blocked by the rightist-military coalition: by the Republican ultraconservatives grouped around Ronald Reagan, by the American Defense Department, by spokesmen for the arms complex, of whom the best known is Senator Jackson. Some weeks ago Ford himself admitted that the conclusion of an accord had been prevented by the "immovability of the Pentagon."

And so, after a long delay, the representative of the new administration landed in Moscow, but with a packet of proposals of which one could say almost with his eyes shut that they were unacceptable. That is why some informed Washington observers warned in advance that there would be a collision of opinions. Three days before Vance's mission, a commentator of the WASHINGTON POST said frankly: "President Carter in effect assumed the same attitude as Senator Jackson and the military chiefs of staff on this complex but basic matter."

If we discard the gloss of the American schemes they boiled down to one aim: to gain from the talks a nuclear missile advantage for the United States (which it had lost some years previously). According to those schemes the USSR would have to reconcile itself to the exclusion of the cruise missile from the agreed limitations, or to drastically cut its arsenal of so-called heavy missiles without a reciprocal American reduction. What naivete!

As is known the existing balance of strategic forces which assures equilibrium in the world consists of the fact that each of the two great powers has an arsenal that is equal overall, but not identical. In attempting to obtain from the opposite party a renunciation of its "strong points"--since the United States did not possess the equivalent of the "heavy missiles"--without touching its own strong points, the American side again postponed the agreement.

It is no secret that an agreement can be reached exclusively through equal security and equal advantage. This principle did not guide the authors of the proposals the secretary of state presented in Moscow. And while some western commentators wrote about a "serious departure" by the United States from the accord reached in Vladivostok, it must be added that it also violates the principle of equality which had been agreed upon by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States 5 years previously.

Disturbance

The disturbance of the course of the SALT-2 talks naturally has not changed the balance of forces in the world or the objective need for finding a way out of the--let us hope--temporary impasse. At the press conference after the conclusion of the talks with Cyrus Vance, Minister Andrey Gromyko stressed the USSR's readiness to continue the process of improving relations with the United States. "We would like," he said, "to make our relations more stable and based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. It would be even better if they had a friendly character."

The latest statements by President Carter and State Secretary Vance, apart from defending unrealistic military propositions, appear to show that the Washington administration is aware of the need to improve the relations along the main international axis and is keeping the door open for a deeper dialog with Moscow. Vance has described the USSR attitude on Middle East affairs as "constructive" while Carter labeled the meeting of his secretary of state with Leonid Brezhnev and Andrey Gromyko as "productive" and assured that he is "not disallusioned."

The Main Point

Moscow PRAVDA also called these talks essential and useful. Working groups have been set up for a common analysis of the key international problems. In May there will be a meeting of the heads of the foreign ministries of both states, mainly to discuss Middle East affairs, but probably also the limitation of armaments.

The limitation of armaments is surely the central problem of modern times and the basic driving force behind the prospects of detente. A shift for the better in the Soviet-American relations was organically linked with the adoption of these relations as a basis for the strategic balance and the gradual reduction of the arms ceiling. Attempts to gain supremacy lead to nowhere while the time consumed by the change of the ruling administrations in the United States is lost.

No one can doubt that the sooner the new administration of President Carter stops experimenting in a sphere which requires stabilization the more secure and friendlier the world will be, for America as well.

CSO: 2600

POLAND

AFTERMATH OF 1976 RIOTS VIEWED BY 'LE MONDE' CORRESPONDENT

Paris LE MONDE in French 2, 3 Mar 77

[Article by Manuel Lucbert: "Poland After the Ordeal"]

[2 Mar 77, pp 1,4]

[Text] De Guiringaud will make an official visit to Poland from Wednesday 2 March through Friday 4 March.

Scheduled to arrive in Warsaw at 1900 hours, the French minister of foreign affairs will have an interview with his Polish counterpart, Emil Wojtaszek, who is giving a dinner for him. On Thursday morning, after touring the city and laying a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, de Guiringaud will be received by Gierek, first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] (communist), and by Jablonski, chairman of the State Council (who acts as president of the republic).

He will hold a press conference and will offer a dinner in Wojtaszek's honor. The minister will return to Paris on Friday morning.

Gierek's Pardon

Warsaw--Is Gierek going to win the game again? Is he going to save his halo as a man knowing how to talk to the people, a reputation he acquired when he came to power in December 1970 following the riots in Gdansk and Gdynia? By an undoubtedly inevitable process, the former Silesian miner had imperceptibly lost contact with the masses as the years passed. His colleagues in the Political Bureau hardly appreciated his direct style, which was in too glaring a contrast with the usual methods used by communist governments. And since Gierek had not been able--or had not tried--to keep his promises concerning democratization, particularly in connection with the labor unions, and since he had no new promises to offer, what was the use of going on as before?

The situation was made worse by the explosion last June following the announcement of price increases. It began to look suspiciously like the state of deterioration that had characterized the final years of the Gomulka era. Since the beginning of February, however, the climate has changed. Not radically, but very noticeably. After 7 months of increasingly obvious political and social crisis--the names of possible successors were already being mentioned in Warsaw's cafes--Gierek took the bull by the horns. Last 3 February, in a speech to workers at the Ursus tractor factory near Warsaw, where serious incidents had taken place on 25 June, the first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) announced pardons for most of the troublemakers.

It was not a regular amnesty of the type being demanded by the bishops and the Committee for the Defense of the Workers. But even though limited to "those who show their remorse and promise not to repeat the offense," that free pardon expresses the desire of the government and especially of Gierek personally to forget the "episode," as the first secretary called it.

Why did the authorities wait so long before taking a step which, considering the extent of the discontent in the country, had been dictated by good sense as early as the end of the year? There are indications that the party leadership was divided on the issue for several months and that the matter was not settled until the beginning of December, during the fifth plenum of the Central Committee, which also saw the replacement of some individuals.

In outline, there were two opposing theses. Some leaders minimized the importance of last June's demonstrations by the workers and felt that the most urgent task was to restore the state's authority, using strong measures if necessary. Prime Minister Jaroszewicz is said to have been among them, along with three other members of the Political Bureau: Babiuch, who since the Seventh Party Congress had been looking more and more like the regime's number two man; Kepa, the (feared) first secretary for Warsaw; and Lukaszewicz, chief of propaganda.

Most of the other leaders, on the other hand, with Gierek at their head, considered it a serious matter that a rift had been created between the workers and the party. They felt that above all else, it was indispensable to calm people down by showing understanding and moderation. As early as the beginning of September, Gierek, who had demanded personal responsibility for the dossier on the events of 25 June and their aftermath, asked the State Council in writing to recommend that the attorney general show magnanimity toward those imprisoned workers who had previously enjoyed "a good reputation." On 27 September, the Supreme Court considerably reduced the sentences of seven Ursus workers. But at the same time, in Radom, the trials continued. The attempt to distinguish between "good workers" misled into revolt and "hooligans" (the criminal element) responsible for all the outbursts was not convincing to a great many people.

Surely the most effective element in strengthening Gierek's position was the trip he made to the USSR at the beginning of November. Curiously, Babiuch,

who originally had been slated to be part of the delegation, did not go along. And neither did Kepa or Szydlak, the Central Committee's secretary for economic affairs and chairman of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society. On the other hand, Gierek had skillfully, and rather uncharacteristically, surrounded himself with representatives of the Peasant and Democratic parties and with Iwaszkiewicz, chairman of the Union of Polish Writers.

With Moscow's support assured, the first secretary was able in early December to proceed with a reshuffling, the significance of which was not always clearly understood at the time but which, in the final analysis, appears to have strengthened his position. Now it can be seen that the losers were Kepa and Szydlak, since Kepa was obliged to give up his fief in Warsaw and Szydlak (although he stayed on for technical reasons until January) was forced to surrender his post in the Party Secretariat. Both men are still members of the Political Bureau, but their influence as deputy prime ministers will be less important than in the past. This is true especially of Kepa, who has been assigned to supervise the transportation sector. Szydlak, on the other hand, received greater consolation, seeing that he, along with Jagielski, acts as substitute for the head of the government when the latter is absent or ill.

Olszowski's Return

The winner is certainly Gierek, but perhaps an even bigger winner is Stefan Olszowski, who has been restored to a post in the Secretariat that he had been forced to surrender in 1971. Many Polish observers of political life feel that Olszowski, one of the youngest members in the leadership, must now be regarded as the man of the future. Of course, that will depend to a large extent on the restoration of equilibriums in the economic sector, which he has been assigned to keep watch over. His assignment came as a surprise, because while Olszowski has accumulated numerous capabilities in the course of his career as he has progressed from student affairs through propaganda to foreign affairs, he had not been regarded previously as a first-rank economist. But spiteful tongues in Warsaw are saying that it will not necessarily be a bad thing to have the economy managed by a nonspecialist, and Olszowski will round out his training in the process. Besides, he has the reputation of being an energetic man, and in the present circumstances, that is certainly an asset.

But it is necessary to look beyond this redistribution of roles at the top. The crisis of the last few months has once again revealed how easily certain groups have resorted to nationalist and anti-Semitic feeling in times of difficulty. At the same time--and for the first time in 20 years--the government has found itself at grips with a combined protest by the workers and the intellectuals, the start of openly organized opposition. Lastly, the crisis has brought the question of reforms into very sharp focus.

At the university, tracts with a strange content and issued by "young students" have been circulated. Exalting "fatherland, people, and nation" and citing

almost exclusively the names of members of Jewish origin on the Committee for the Defense of the Workers, one of those documents deplores the fact that "Poland is threatened with moral and physical destruction and with annihilation of the national spirit." It continues, "Instead of being a poor relative of the Russian brother, we must become Russia's partner and solid ally, imposing our conditions on our neighbors to the south and west just as it does."

For their part, the members of the Union of Polish Writers in Warsaw received a forgery supposedly sent by the Club of Polish Thought in London. It attacked "international Jewry," whose spokesman was said to be Kissinger. Word-of-mouth propaganda has sometimes asserted that the solidarity funds available to the defense committee were Israeli or West German in origin. Those manifestations should not be given too much weight, and their effect is undoubtedly minimal. But it is significant that some groups considered the moment opportune for reviving that type of argument, which had also flourished during the crisis of 1968.

For Gierek, the problem posed by the existence of the Committee for the Defense of the Workers is undoubtedly even more critical as far as the immediate future is concerned. Although declared illegal by the government spokesman, that committee, which was established last September at the instigation of a few young Catholic intellectuals, is nevertheless continuing its activity. We asked Ryszard Frelek, secretary of the Central Committee and a close associate of Gierek's: "Is this a way of recognizing a sort of opposition?" He answered, "Not at all. But we will not give those people the satisfaction of being thrown in jail. Gierek is opposed to any repression of that kind. It has been several years since anyone in Poland was arrested for political reasons, and we would like to keep it that way forever. The people on that committee are not going to get the martyrs they want."

The speech at Ursus on 3 February confirmed that line of action. Relying on weariness and its policy of appeasement, the government may hope that the pardons will gradually eliminate the reason for the defense committee's existence. According to the attorney general, only 45 of the 78 individuals arrested in November were still in prison on 17 February. Moreover, while the committee's members may have achieved unity in actions of solidarity or for demanding the establishment of a commission of inquiry, would they be able to maintain it in the same way if the situation gradually returned to normal? What would be the attitude of the working classes in such a situation?

In recent months Gierek has had to face two contradictory imperatives. First, he has had to avoid a collision with government officials favoring respect for "law and order." That group is apparently not a negligible force, since the weekly POLITYKA recently addressed a warning to those who demand "a policy of strong action" and believe "that all social problems can be resolved with orders and prohibitions." Second, in order to remain faithful to himself, the first secretary has had the duty of trying to recover the store of confidence placed in him by the population.

In a tone of some disillusionment, one old communist writer in Warsaw told us: "In the old days--in the 1950's--there was faith and fear. Now faith has disappeared, and the Poles are no longer afraid." And it is a fact that contemporary Polish society no longer allows itself to be governed with a big stick or by the invocation of a universal communist creed. It wants to understand. As was well shown by one of the films that has enjoyed great success in Warsaw in recent weeks--"Do They Still Beat People Here?" by Marek Piowski--it is wondering about the notion of law and order and the relations of sincerity between authority and the citizen. Some leaders realize this. But how can such a debate be resolved if there is obstinate refusal to reform or to adapt the system in the slightest way?

[3 Mar 77, p 2]

Butter or Reforms?

[Text] In his first installment, entitled "Gierek's Pardon" [above], Manuel Lucbert described the changed climate in Warsaw since the start of February in the aftermath of the political and social crisis that followed the riots of June 1976. The head of the Polish party has partially eliminated the supporters of strong action, but will he be able to regain the population's confidence, which has been seriously eroded over the years? He must simultaneously avoid too strong a collision with those officials who insist on respect for "law and order," disarm the Committee for the Defense of the Workers, and restore a climate of confidence with the population.

Warsaw--In February 1971, the weekly POLITYKA published a document regarded at the time as a sort of program for the new team headed by Gierek. That text assigned an important place to "socialist democracy" and to modernization of the economy.

During the past 6 years, Polish industry has been considerably renovated, but the project of undertaking to democratize social, economic, and union life came to a rather rapid halt. The events of June 1976 have made it quite clear that the labor union was not fulfilling its task of protecting the living conditions of the wage earners any better or any more than it had in the past. The 1971 "program" had nevertheless provided for a change of style and method in that organization's activity. It had said that the organization's "essential task" must be to concern itself with the working conditions of the workers, with social questions, and with relationships between individuals in the firms.

The role of the workers councils--a pale reflection of the organizations that came to life in 1956 or in December 1970--was not increased, either. The Polish system is certainly less authoritarian than those elsewhere in East Europe. The fact that there is less social homogeneity--due to the influence

of the Catholic Church and to the size of the private agricultural sector--certainly has a lot to do with this. The fact remains, however, that in the absence of real structures for participation or worker control, every social conflict that becomes even slightly severe is in danger of degenerating into a riot, as recent history shows.

The crisis of June 1976 seems to have had at least one result: that of imposing more clearly than before the principle of "consultation" with the wage earners. That idea, too, had been advanced in 1971. Consultation was even supposed to be "permanent" and to become an "element in the mechanism of government." But last year's decision to raise prices revealed what a caricature the practical application of that principle had become. The workers were given 24 hours in which to express an opinion on measures that the government had hesitated to adopt for more than 5 years and that the experts had spent months putting together. The leaders seem to have realized that such a situation should not be repeated in the future. Frelek, secretary of the Central Committee, told us, "If the problem with prices comes up again, the discussion among the workers will last for several weeks."

Frelek also assured us that "the strengthening of self-management by the workers is a matter of great concern to the party leadership." For example, to show his interest in that institution, Gierek sent a letter at the end of last year to the organizations that oversee self-management. But the concept in Poland is far from having the same content that it has in Yugoslavia, and one can safely say that the first secretary's gesture alone will not suffice to transform the nature of self-management in Poland.

The fact remains that of the Political Bureau's members, Gierek is undoubtedly among those who invoke most frequently, and apparently with the most conviction, the need to introduce dialog with the workers. In the letter addressed to the employees of the General Walter factory in Radom on 3 February, he wrote: "Our party always listens attentively to the voice of the masses; as for myself, I personally attach the greatest importance to the opinion of the working class." (That firm was the scene of the initial disorders last 25 June that were to end with the sacking of the party building.) In the same message, the first secretary was careful to emphasize that the principle of consultation was "constitutional," and he added, "Nothing will cause us to stray from the path of socialist democracy."

Compared to the reform hopes of 20 years ago, that intention, commendable as it may be, appears quite limited in scope. One has the feeling that it is a matter of fixing up the system--of making it more viable--rather than of correcting in a lasting manner certain inherent defects. The problem is not new, and so far it has not been resolved anywhere in East Europe. The fear that a change at one point will eventually bring about the reform of the entire system remains an overriding one everywhere.

The regimes in East Europe have felt that the most appropriate way to silence yearnings for democracy is to promise a better standard of living. Gierek's

Poland has also wanted to experience the pleasures of "goulash socialism." But one does not enter the society of abundance overnight. How does one prepare goulash when there is no meat? For lack of forage in sufficient quantities, the number of hogs decreased by nearly one-fourth last year, while the number of cattle declined by 6 percent in total--but by 10 percent among the independent peasants. To lessen the shock, the government was forced to halt some exports and bring in "sizable" imports. The same thing is going to happen this year. Large purchases of cereals and fodder (8 million tons) have thus had to be made. The cost was particularly high: 1 billion dollars, or the equivalent of the income from coal exports.

The government seems aware of the fact that its plan to make life more agreeable for the citizens will not succeed without a radical improvement in the situation with agriculture. In recent months, agricultural questions were debated at two plenums of the Central Committee--in September and in January. While nationalization of land remains the long-term objective, the party's guiding policy in the short term does not always show up clearly. Being a constant compromise between ideological constraints and the need to avoid a direct collision with the peasants, its policy is characterized by considerable pragmatism.

Making Agriculture Profitable

Two measures stand out in that policy: the transfer of land to the state by independent peasants and the specialization of farms. From 1971 through 1975, the state recovered 150,000 hectares per year. Last year the rate doubled, since state-owned lands increased by 290,000 hectares. This trend should become more pronounced owing to the advanced age of about one-third of the farmers and as a result of a recent government decision. In January the Central Committee plenum approved the principle of paying a retirement pension to all peasants based on the sales of their production to the central trading organizations. This means that elderly farmers will no longer be required, as before, to transfer their farms to the state in order to receive a pension. But in practice, it will all come down to the same thing, since a number of farmers no longer have heirs.

Gierek has described that measure as a "historic advance in achieving the principles of social justice." It does not become effective until 1 January 1980. Between now and then, the farmers should be encouraged to increase their sales to the state, something that will improve the situation in the market. The regrouping of several private farms and their specialization in stockraising should also have a beneficial effect on production and, as a consequence, on supplies to the market.

Restoring equilibrium in the market has in fact become priority number one on the domestic level. The leaders are continuing to invoke the economic line of the sixth and seventh congresses. The rates of development should in principle be adhered to over the decade, but priorities were considerably altered at the end of last year for the benefit of "Sector B," meaning light

industry. It is said officially that this is not a matter of a change in policy, but rather, as Gierek said during the December plenum, of a "specific maneuver." The drop in the rate of accumulation of national income reflects this new orientation, which is more favorable to consumption. It was 32 percent in 1975--one of the highest in East Europe, together with Romania and Albania--but in 1977 it will be down to 27.4 percent, and next year it will drop to 26 percent. Simultaneously, investments during the 5-year period from 1976 through 1980 will return to a more normal rate: they will increase by 43 percent in 5 years, compared to 132 percent between 1971 and 1975.

Equilibrium in Trade

In the next few years, therefore, the Polish economy is to furnish the market with sufficient quantities of consumer goods to absorb liquidity in the hands of the population. But since the development of production will not suffice in itself to restore equilibrium, especially in the food and furniture industries, pressure will be placed on wages. It is provided that in real terms, wages are not to increase by more than from 16 to 18 percent between now and 1980, compared to 40 percent between 1971 and 1975. But there is nothing to guarantee that that objective will be achieved: the wage fund has regularly been exceeded in all recent years--in 1976 by an amount of 13 billion zlotys. The combativeness of the workers is partially responsible for those overruns.

Another equilibrium to be restored is that in foreign trade: imports last year continued to rise faster than exports, and there was a deficit of 2 billion dollars. The government hopes to reverse steam and is predicting that the deficit will have disappeared beginning in 1978. Even if that prediction comes true, it will still be necessary to repay the foreign debt, which is estimated at between 10 and 15 billion dollars.

Will all these "specific maneuvers" succeed? In the economic area as well as in political life, the results will depend largely on the ability of the leaders to restore a climate of confidence. Following the agitation of recent months, the situation has more or less stabilized. For Gierek and his companions, it was a close shave. But while the worst of the ordeal is over, times remain difficult in Warsaw.

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ROMANIA

MANESCU CONGRATULATES SYRIAN COUNTERPART ON NATIONAL DAY

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 17 Apr 77 p 6 AU

[Text] To His Excellency, Mr 'Abd al-Rahman Khylayfawi, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Syrian Arab Republic, Damascus.

On the National Day of the Syrian Arab Republic, the 31st anniversary of the proclamation of the country's independence, I want to extend to you on behalf of the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania and on my own behalf, sincere wishes for health and personal happiness and wishes for progress and well-being to the friendly Syrian people.

I want to express the conviction that the sound relations of friendship and fruitful cooperation between our countries will experience a forceful development in the future to benefit both our countries and the cause of peace and international cooperation.

[signed] Manea Manescu, premier of the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

WRITER WARNS AGAINST MISUSE OF WORKS, NAME BY HOSTILE CIRCLES

Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA in Romanian 14 Apr 77 p 5

[Article by I. Negoitescu: "About Patriotism"]

[Text] Love of country is a sentiment which covers an area which is broad in space and profound in time. That which raises up and unified the sons of an entire people, in their contemporary existence, is this sentiment which has the power to unite all the co-inhabitants of the country in such an immense common existence that it easily passes from the stage of sensibility to that of awareness; this sentiment also has the power to link contemporary life closely and richly with the past, with the traditions, made up of living dowries, with the thousands and thousands of men of vanished epochs, who have made efforts and struggled, among joys and afflictions, for the creation of the spiritual heritage which they have left for us, so that we can be what we are today, those who carry creation further. This sentiment also has the power to link us, the hard-working builders of our days, closely and richly with those who will come after us and will inherit, in their turn, our work, self-sacrifice, and hopes.

Love of country achieves its highest point, in the awareness of a people's own, unique destiny, a destiny made concrete in its history which is, at the same time, past, present, and future. This is why its most pathetic manifestation, uniting the tragic and the sublime, is produced in moments of extreme urgency, when this destiny, which is the national essence itself, is felt or seen to be threatened by enemies; our history is filled with such examples and we all know that we will always be ready for battle, no matter how fierce, if the national essence of the Romanian people is ever put to the test.

Besides the general and communal love of country, and simultaneous with this, there is a personal patriotic sentiment which each Romanian shows and should show in the area of his professional activity which implicitly is reflected in the community sphere. You love your country not only by anticipating

dangers or not only in words but, especially, through your daily work and activity, intended to contribute to the creation of the destiny and personality of the entire nation.

Since I am a writer, I have always reflected on the natural obligations, in this sense, which devolve upon each worker in the literary field. Of course, we are all delighted with the achievements of the past, the literary works of our predecessors, in which the image of our contemporary activity is reflected with so much satisfaction and pride. How much work and how much skill, how much self-sacrifice and how much attention have been consumed so that these works could exist and give an authentic profile to the spiritual essence of our people, a unique profile among peoples of the world. There are writers and works which teach us how we, in our turn, sons of the same earth, can enrich it by our work and self-sacrifice, so that all our brothers within the borders of the country will enjoy our achievements, just as, in other fields of activity, they advise us and welcome us; we will not disappoint them but we will give them those moments of satisfaction which they deserve.

Neither I nor any other Romanian writer can allow that our names and works be used by hostile circles outside for the purpose of denigrating Romania. Not only is my country injured in such a case, but also, my very name is seriously abused, as has happened to me, to my distress, on different occasions.

In order to limit myself, in another matter, to the period of the last few years, I cannot refrain from confessing my own satisfaction and joy whenever I have discovered in the stores or on the bookshelves those good books written by my colleagues which help me to see more clearly into the soul of the people to whom I belong, which help me, through contemporary achievements, to explain the works of the past to myself more clearly and to dare to look into the future, deciphering, as much as possible, the premises of this unique and unitary destiny, in differentiation and diversity, which, day by day, only with creative generosity and effort is becoming clearer, being defined, authenticating itself, and asserting itself.

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

'SCINTEIA' REPORTS ON SEW CONGRESS IN WEST BERLIN

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 17 Apr 77 p 6 AU

[Text] West Berlin, 16 Apr (AGERPRES). The proceedings of the Fifth SEW Congress began on Friday evening. The proceedings are attended by 486 delegates, and foreign guests.

After Gerhard Danelius, SEW chairman, had opened the congress, the report of the SEW leadership was presented. The report states that the SEW is for the unity of action of the workers class and for a broad alliance among all democratic forces. The party attaches primary importance to the struggle for improving the social situation of the working masses in West Berlin, and primarily to the struggle for insuring the right to work. The crisis that has affected the capitalist countries, the report stresses, has not by-passed West Berlin either. The city has a total of 38,000 unemployed at this time. The prices of foodstuffs and of basic goods and rents are increasing constantly.

At the same time, the report stresses the need for West Berlin to maintain sound relations with the GDR and the other socialist countries, the congress proceedings continue.

Within the framework of the congress proceedings, the RCP representative, Gheorghe Rosu, member of the RCP Central Committee and first secretary of the Bacau County Party Committee, extended a message of greetings, on behalf of the RCP Central Committee, the RCP and its secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, to the congress participants and to all communists in West Berlin. The RCP representative then presented aspects of our party's domestic and foreign policy.

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

ION LADEA ARRESTED ALONG WITH PAUL GOMA, 'TIMES' BELIEVES

London THE TIMES in English 14 Apr 77 p 7 LD

[Dispatch by Dessa Trevisan: "Arrest of Romanian Human Rights Activist Reported"]

[Text] Zagreb, 13 Apr--Mr Paul Goma, the Romanian author, and several of the other signatories of his appeal complaining about the violation of human rights in Romania, are believed to have been arrested after a decision taken at the highest level on 5 April.

According to Romanian sources the government decided to arrest Mr Goma after it had failed to suppress the movement which began with only eight supporters and in recent months had increased to at least 200, including some leading intellectuals.

It is believed that Professor Ion Ladea, who some years ago was released from prison after serving a 5-year sentence, and has recently joined the human rights movement, was arrested together with Mr Goma.

Mr Goma recently told me that he was compiling a dossier on the misuse of psychiatry against political dissidents. He had then already heard of four cases in which people were sent to mental hospitals after protesting about working conditions or refusing to sign the loyalty pledge to President Ceausescu.

CSO: 2020

ROMANIA

KOREAN LEADER'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATED IN BUCHAREST

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 15 Apr 77 p 3

["Film Gala at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea"]

[Text] On the occasion of the 65th birthday of Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the CC of the Workers' Party of Korea, President of the DPRK, the ambassador of that country in Bucharest, Pak Chung-kuk, organized on 14 April a film gala followed by a cocktail party.

The documentary film "Pyongyang," an achievement of the Korean studios, was shown. The film portrays aspects connected with the activity of the entire people, under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea, headed by Comrade Kim Il-song, for the development and continued prospering of the Korean capital in the years of the building of socialism and of the defense of the revolutionary achievements and of the independence and sovereignty of the country.

The following comrades participated: Emil Bobu, member of the Political Executive Committee, secretary of the CC of the Romanian Communist Party, vice president of the Council of State; Paul Niculescu, member of the Political Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP, deputy prime minister of the government; Neculai Agachi, minister of the metallurgical industry, president of the Romanian-Korean Friendship Association; Dumitru Turcus, Haralambie Alexa, and Liviu Derban, deputy section chiefs in the CC of the RCP; Constantin Oancea, deputy minister of foreign affairs; Major General Gheorghe Gomoiu, deputy minister of national defense and secretary of the Higher Political Council of the Armed Forces; Dumitru Ghise, deputy chairman of the Council for Socialist Culture and Education; Ion Stoian, deputy minister of foreign trade and international economic cooperation, representatives of central institutions, mass and public organizations, persons from the fields of culture and art, and journalists.

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

GOMA'S ARREST PROTESTED--Rome, 16 Apr (ANSA)--The Italian Free Writers Union issued a communique today voicing its concern and dismay for the arrest of Romanian author Paul Goma and other Romanian dissidents. Goma wrote an open letter to participants at a Belgrade conference in June to test the Helsinki Accord. The Italian Writers Union said it was concerned about the fate of these dissenters who had been arrested "for no plausible reason," and urged their release "out of respect for the Helsinki Accords." [Text] [Rome ANSA in English 1940 GMT 16 Apr 77 AU]

CSO: 3120

CROATIAN EXILE PRESENTS VIEWS ON YUGOSLAV MILITARY

[Editorial Report] Ivan Babic, an officer in the prewar Royal Yugoslav Army who served the Croatian rump state during World War II, expounds from his Spanish exile on parallels between the prewar and current roles of the Yugoslav military in Munich/Barcelona HRVATSKA REVIJA in Serbo-Croatian No 4, December 1976, pages 483-501. Babic's basic theme is the persistent exploitation of the Yugoslav army, then and now, as a vehicle of Serb hegemony. To buttress his case, Babic first cites familiar statistics concerning the ethnic affiliation of the prewar military leadership to demonstrate the predominance of Serbs and Montenegrins, appending some personal asides on the pervasive incompetence and corruption in the upper levels of the officer corps. Next, referring to confidential information dating from his tour of duty on the general staff in the early 1930's, Babic describes a conscript assignment system designed to maintain cohesive groupings of Serbs while keeping non-Serbs ("unreliable elements") dispersed. According to Babic, the mobilization system was likewise designed to maximize the Serb presence while diffusing the impact of non-Serbs.

Babic concludes: "This is the past. Still, it is worth describing, knowing, and remembering. It needs to be known, among other reasons, because conditions almost identical to those prevailing in the royal army obtain today in the so-called Yugoslav People's Army. Once again, the ethnic minorities (called "nationalities" [i.e., ethnic groups other than the constituent South Slavic peoples of Yugoslavia]) are unreliable. Once again, the non-Serb peoples are unreliable, especially the Croats. Once again, the leadership of the Yugoslav army is primarily in the hands of Serbs and is an instrument of Serb hegemony. Once again, there is an extra territorial system for service in the army--lightly modified, to be sure, in the sense that some conscripts serve in their own republics, if in garrisons distant from their native areas. Today, the hegemonistic military leadership favors and gives better weapons and equipment to the so-called territorial units in Serbian areas than to those in Croatian areas and tries to keep all in check by means of so-called 'social self-protection,' which is really just a comprehensive system by which everybody spies on everybody else.

"But if we critically assess the current situation in Yugoslavia and its prospects for the future, we may anticipate without excessive optimism that

the vital forces of the 'unreliable' peoples and nationalities--centrifugal in every respect--will be stronger than the hegemonistic instruments in the army and the repressive mechanism outside, so that present-day Yugoslavia, when it goes through its first crisis, will experience the same fate as its predecessor."

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END